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Abstract 
This report provides a case study examining flood risks in the city of Vienna. The 
purpose is to illustrate an interdisciplinary approach to flood risk analysis, combining 
hydrological flood risk assessment and simulation modeling with the finances of flood 
risk management.  
Three scenarios were preliminarily identified for analysis: catastrophic flooding on a 
major European river (the Danube) that flows through Vienna; storm flooding due to 
failure of storm drainage systems; and flash flooding of a small tributary (the Vienna 
River) that flows into the Danube.  Our initial efforts revealed that the Vienna River 
flash flooding scenario was a credible, significant, and tractable problem for analysis. 
The wealth of data available also made this scenario a useful test case for developing 
and illustrating interdisciplinary work, which is a significant aspect of the project 
activity. The focus of this report is, therefore, on the flash-flooding scenario. This report 
does not include discussion of the other scenarios, as they were not completed in an 
interdisciplinary fashion either because of lack of adequate data and models for all 
aspects of an interdisciplinary study, or because there were judged to be non-credible 
and therefore of limited use as an illustrative example. 
In the course of developing an interdisciplinary approach to examining catastrophic 
flood risks, we found that the concept of risk used in flood management varied subtly 
but significantly between the disciplines contributing to the study.  An important result 
of this study is the integration of these different disciplinary concepts of risk within a 
single interdisciplinary analysis.  A fuller accounting for uncertainty in a way that is 
consistent between the component disciplines, and the appropriate distinction between 
various different types of uncertainty, form a second major aspect of the study. Our 
primary finding is that an approach that integrates perspectives on risk characteristic of 
the different technical disciplines contributing to this study is feasible and that it 
provides a useful framework for comparing the characteristics of different mitigation 
strategies.  The results of simulations suggest alternatives for combining different 
mitigation measures such that the characteristics of different components of an overall 
strategy complement each other to lower total costs and to reduce both the likelihood 
and the uncertainties of catastrophic financial losses.  
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Development of a Catastrophe Model for Managing the 
Risks of Urban Flash Flooding in Vienna  
 
1.  Introduction and Theoretical Background 
 
The purpose of this report is to illustrate an interdisciplinary approach to flood risk 
analysis, combining hydrological flood risk assessment and simulation modeling with 
the finances of flood risk management. We do this by examining flood risks in the city 
of Vienna together with some alternatives for mitigation of the damages caused by 
flooding. 
In the course of developing an interdisciplinary approach to examining catastrophic 
flood risks, we found that the concept of risk used in flood management varied subtly 
but significantly between the disciplines contributing to the study.  However, although 
the differences in usage may appear subtle, the way in which the term "risk" is 
conceptualized (for example, as probability, as consequence, as expected value, etc.) 
can significantly affect the way in which the analysis produced within a particular 
discipline is structured.  More importantly, it can significantly affect conclusions about 
recommended courses of actions, particularly when a decision-maker is faced with 
choosing from among very different options developed on the basis of analyses 
prepared within different disciplinary frameworks.  This can arise, for example, when 
attempting to decide whether to implement a structural approach (e.g., raising the height 
of river levees) or a financial approach (e.g., transferring the risks through insurance). 
An important result of this study is the integration of these different disciplinary 
concepts of risk within a single interdisciplinary analysis.  We also show that the way in 
which uncertainty is defined and represented is not consistent between different 
disciplines.   
This project has been carried out within the framework of catastrophe model 
development.  We will spend some effort in this section to introduce the reader to 
different concepts of risk that arise within catastrophe modeling.   We will first discuss a 
taxonomy of perspectives on risk, show how our approach fits into a larger taxonomy, 
and then discuss the way risk is conceptualized in the technical disciplines contributing 
to this study. Finally, we discuss the impact of uncertainty in catastrophe modeling and 
introduce an approach for integrating multiple concepts of uncertainty into catastrophe 
modeling. The remainder, and majority, of the report (Chapters 2-5) lays out a concrete 
implementation of these ideas in a case study examining the urban flooding in Vienna. 
A brief set of general observations and conclusions is presented in Chapter 6. 
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The approach illustrated in this study will be useful for examining policy paths, 
including flood risk mitigation and insurance, for managing the risks of flooding in 
Vienna and elsewhere. Our results build on on-going work at BOKU and IIASA on the 
development and use of models in the management of catastrophic risks (Amendola et 
al. 2000; Brouwers 2003; Ekenberg et al 2003; Ermoliev et al. 2000; Ermolieva, 1997; 
Faber and Nachtnebel, 2002, 2003; Freeman et al., 2002; Konecny and Nachtnebel, 
1985; Nachtnebel and Faber, 2002; Nachtnebel, 2000; Mechler, 2003). These studies 
encompass a wide variety of disciplines, catastrophes, and spatial and temporal scales. 
As in any analysis, we have operated under significant constraints, some external and 
some self imposed. A self-imposed constraint is that it is not our goal in this analysis to 
attempt to provide and implement a 'true' definition of the term "risk" or "uncertainty". 
It is not clear if such a task is even possible. Neither do we attempt to include all 
possible concepts of risk within our larger analysis, although we do attempt to provide 
some glimpses of how this analysis might fit into a broader decision-making 
framework. As will become apparent, this report remains very firmly within a technical 
perspective and does not deal with non-technical (for example, psychological or 
sociological) perspectives on risk. We do not intend to propose a canonical definition 
that can fit any situation. Our intention is only to clarify the way in which we have used 
these terms, and to show how a slightly broader conception allows integration across 
different technical (hydraulic and financial) disciplines. Such an integration yields, in 
turn, the ability to produce meaningful comparisons of very different flood mitigation 
alternatives. In addition, external constraints on the availability of resources and data 
over the course of the study restrict the usefulness of this analysis as a direct input into 
policy decisions regarding flooding for the city of Vienna. The study was not 
commissioned to provide such input. This report is a case study that illustrates an 
approach to catastrophe modeling that relies on real data and addresses a real problem. 
Although every effort was made to use high quality data, to produce accurate models, 
and to deal with issues of relevance to policy makers, this study lacks several critical 
elements of a decision support study. Quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) 
reviews of data and codes were not undertaken. A review of the legal and regulatory 
requirements for a decision was not performed.  These aspects often impose significant 
legal and scheduling constraints on the analyst, and together with the budgetary and 
time constraints typical of applied analyses, hinder the exploration of alternate 
approaches to structuring and evaluating problems. We do hope to raise some 
interesting questions and suggest some possible courses of action should similar 
situations arise elsewhere.  We are grateful to have had the opportunity to explore a very 
applied problem with the freedom to address issues and make decisions in the way that 
seemed most appropriate from an intellectual perspective rather than being forced to 
follow pre-defined approaches because of external constraints. 
1.1 Concepts of Risk  
The way risks are understood, analyzed, and quantified varies widely depending upon 
what type of system is under consideration. In his risk taxonomy, Ortwin Renn (1992) 
distinguishes four perspectives: technical, economic, psychological, and sociological. 
As previously mentioned, the scope of this study is largely within the technical 
perspective. However, evaluation of insurance and financial mechanisms for spreading 
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and covering flood consequences implies financial representation of risks.  According to 
Renn, the technical perspective of risks comprises a statistical or actuarial approach 
(typically used in the insurance community), a modeling approach (typically used in the 
health and environmental protection community), and probabilistic models (typically 
used in safety engineering). A goal of this study is the integration of these typically 
distinct approaches within the technical perspective. According to Covello and 
Merkhofer (1993)  "risk is, at a minimum, a two-dimensional concept involving (1) the 
possibility of an adverse outcome, and (2) uncertainty over the occurrence, timing, or 
magnitude of that adverse outcome" (need page number).  This definition is appropriate 
for our purposes since it offers fruitful opportunities for integrating the differing 
technical perspectives. Although largely consistent with the concept of risk used within 
the financial community, there are differences. Financial experts, extending back to the 
definition provided by Frank Knight (1921), use the term "risk" to refer to a measurable 
(typically statistical) volatility and speak of "upside" and "downside" risks to refer to the 
possibility that an outcome may be respectively either better or worse than the expected 
outcome. The differences are subtle but significant. The financial definition is narrower 
in that Knight's concept of risk explicitly excludes epistemic uncertainty, and includes 
only variability (often called aleatory uncertainty). However, this concept is also 
broader in that the possibilities of unexpected positive outcomes are also included. The 
distinction is relevant to the extent that a policy oriented towards "loss prevention" or 
"loss reduction" can sometimes blind one to the possibilities that may exist for 
maximizing welfare1. The common theme is that both concepts of risk arising within 
the technical perspective include, either implicitly or explicitly, probability and 
consequences of occurrence as the two major risk components. Our goal is to implement 
a concept of risk that includes the probability/consequence distinction and the (implicit) 
full conception of uncertainty advocated by Covello and Merkhofer, but broadens 
consequences to include upside risks as well as downside risks.  We emphasize that the 
psychological dimensions, such as the aversion that individuals might have for certain 
types of risk, or sociological aspects, such as the equitable distribution of risks, are not 
typically considered in technical risk analyses. For this reason, technical analyses are 
only one input into a larger policy processes. Experience has also demonstrated the 
many dimensions to risks that are not included in estimates of probability and 
consequence, such as whether the risk is voluntary or controllable. 
Technical disciplines concerned with standard setting have often emphasized one of the 
two component concepts of risk at the expense of the other.  For example, in safety 
engineering the risks are associated with the reliability of a construction and probability 
of its failure. In this case, risks are endogenous on decisions. Traditionally, measures are 
directed towards increasing safety with less emphasis put on the estimation of the 
consequences of potential failure.  This approach focuses on probability of occurrence 
as a measure of risk. A scenario to be avoided is identified (e.g., destructive flooding, 
release of radioactivity from an nuclear reactor, etc.) and the "risk" is the probability of 
occurrence of the adverse event.  Typical examples of this paradigm include traditional 
                                                 
1
 According to White and co-workers (2001), "...there are very few efforts to estimate the net benefits of 
location of land use in hazard areas of the actual benefits of extreme events...Land and locations in areas 
subject to hazard have market value, often high market value...some effort to calculate net gains and 
losses should be undertaken in the literature and its continuing absence in these texts reveals a prevailing 
state of ignorance that the research efforts have scarcely addressed." 
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approaches to flood and earthquake protection.  In traditional flood protection, for 
example, a typical goal is to reduce the probability of flooding to below a certain design 
value, such as a hundred year flood (i.e., the probability of flooding in any year should 
be less than 1%). Other disciplines have focused on the magnitude of the adverse 
consequences as a measure of risk, most frequently keeping by attempting to keep 
consequences below a certain level determined to be "acceptable" or “safe” regardless 
of the likelihood of the effect. This approach is embodied, for example, in regulations 
banning substances found to be carcinogenic. Setting exposures to hazardous chemicals 
in the workplace or in the environment such that no adverse effects are expected, 
without explicit regard to the likelihood of that exposure, is an example of this 
paradigm. This reasoning, especially when the consequences may be very serious or 
catastrophic and the probabilities are difficult to assess, is the logic underlying the 
European Union’s precautionary principle. Within the actuarial community, on the other 
hand, both probabilities and consequences are considered explicitly. However, they are 
typically telescoped together by the use of "expected value" as a measure of risk. 
1.2  Aleatory Uncertainty, Epistemic Uncertainty, and Risk Curves 
Uncertainty in the likelihood of floods arises from a number of sources. These 
uncertainties can be grouped into two fundamental types: aleatory and epistemic. 
Aleatory uncertainty, sometimes called irreducible uncertainty, arises from the natural 
variability of the system under study. Some systems are fundamentally stochastic in 
nature and their future state cannot be predicted deterministically. There are many 
examples of this in nature, such as the number of radioactive decay events observed 
within a specific time frame from a specific quantity of material or the time between 
earthquakes of a given magnitude on a particular fault. For our study, the natural 
variability is the time expected until a storm of a certain magnitude occurs2. Rainfall 
patterns are not identical from year to year. This type of uncertainty is termed 
"irreducible" uncertainty because it is a property of the phenomenon itself. However, 
although the maximum rainfall cannot be predicted with precision, it has been found 
that these values follow regular statistical distributions. The likelihood that the worst 
storm in a year will exceed a certain level may, to a first approximation, be estimated 
simply by collecting information every year on the worst storm (e.g., the amount of rain 
falling within a six hour period) and developing an empirical distribution. The 
functional form of the distribution can be determined based on statistical principles, or 
can be assigned based upon engineering judgment. The statistical problem is then using 
the historical data to find the parameters of the distribution. 
This example also illustrates the second source of uncertainty, namely, epistemic 
uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge about the system and 
can be introduced by errors or by limitations on the ability to collect samples. In many 
locations, reliable historical records may only cover a period of several decades. Even if 
                                                 
2
 The magnitude or severity of a rainstorm is often defined as the amount of rainfall averaged over a 
specific period of time. Because rainfall is a stochastic process, the averaging time affects the peak 
rainfall. For example, a storm may produce bursts of rain at 100 mm/hr for periods of a few minutes, but 
will produce only 50 mm/hr when averaged over a period of three hours. In this study, we will use the six 
hour average rainfall as the indicator of the magnitude of a storm, as it is this period that corresponds to 
the response time of the watershed under study. 
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it were, measuring peak rainfall or river flow during a storm is subject to error. There is 
also no guarantee that climatic conditions generating the rainfall or land use patterns 
that affect the rate at which water drains into the river have not changed over the period 
of measurement; in fact, it is quite likely that such conditions have in fact changed. 
Finally, the choice of a model to describe the variability distribution is not a clear-cut 
process. Fitting observed data to an incorrect model can lead to errors in prediction. 
These and other sources of error lead to epistemic uncertainty. Such uncertainty may not 
be severe when trying to estimate the expected annual maximum or the maximum to be 
expected once every 5-10 years. However, the uncertainty involved in estimating the 
magnitude of storms that recur over the period of centuries or of millennia are 
dramatically larger than estimating the magnitude of storms that recur over the period of 
years or decades. Although such uncertainties are also present in evaluating the 
magnitude of storms that recur over shorter periods, the range of possible values may 
not be terribly large. Extrapolation from short observation periods to very long 
observation periods amplifies the sources of uncertainties and progressively violates the 
assumptions of an underlying steady-state made in developing the forecasts. The range 
of possible values of peak rainfall during a decadal storm, or a storm that is expected to 
occur once every decade, may vary only over a few tens of millimeters and may be 
managed by simply adding an appropriate design margin onto an engineered design.  In 
the United States, the use of a safety margin on levee heights of three feet 
(approximately 1 meter) was just such a consideration (National Research Council, 
2000). However, when attempting to protect against storms that recur over period of 
millennia, the range of peak rainfalls that might be reasonably expected can range over 
tens to hundreds of millimeters. The worst flood in a millennium may be only slightly 
more severe than the worst flood in a century, or it could be dramatically worse. If one 
applies the typical design margin or safety factor approach, one might end up installing 
a system in which most of the costs were directed at ensuring that the design margin 
was sufficiently large. On the other hand, if one simply used a “best” estimate (such as 
an expected value or a most likely value), one might find that there is a significant 
probability that the protection system would not function if the storm was much larger 
than the best estimate. 
However, once effective measures are taken to protect against the more frequent floods, 
it is precisely these rare and uncertain floods that may now pose the majority of the risk 
to the affected populations.  The decision maker is therefore in a quandary with pitfalls 
on either side. If the true likelihood of a particular severe flood is quite high and no 
mitigation efforts are undertaken, massive damages might result. On the other hand, if 
the true likelihood is low and expensive mitigation measure are undertaken, then the 
resources used to implement the mitigation may have been lost if the event fails to 
occur. In the worst of all possible worlds, expensive mitigation measures could be 
implemented but fail when called upon to withstand the flood.  In this case, losses are 
incurred both before the disaster (mitigation costs) and as a result of the disaster (in 
terms of damage to assets). In addition to the costs and benefits of different mitigation 
measures, the reliability of the mitigation measures is therefore a critical input to 
decision making. Determining the best course of action in such a case is problematic 
and depends sensitively on the preferences and values of the decision-maker. When 
significant uncertainties are present about the timing or magnitude of the potential loss, 
it is not possible to simply compare costs and benefits of different options. It is the 
specific goal of this chapter (and more generally, of the whole report) to illustrate a way 
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to structure these uncertainties in such a way that the decision maker can see the results 
of a decision and to what extent the losses and attendant uncertainties change under 
different decisions. 
The approach we have chosen uses a "risk curve" or CCDF (complementary cumulative 
distribution function) to characterize the risk. A single CCDF plots the magnitude of an 
event on the horizontal axis vs. the probability of exceeding that magnitude on the 
vertical axis. This technique is widely used in other risk analytic activities, most notably 
in reactor safety studies. This method was used in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study to 
illustrate the number of potential deaths from an accident at a nuclear reactor as a 
function of the likelihood of their occurrence. Typically, the plot is log-linear, with the 
exceedence probability as the ordinate (vertical axis) on a logarithmic scale and the 
consequence plotted as the abscissa (horizontal axis). The use of a log-linear scale 
allows a much finer resolution of the characteristics of low probability events3. The risk 
curve is useful in this regard because it explicitly represents both the probability and the 
consequence. For example, whereas a standard "safety margin" approach cannot 
distinguish between a system failure resulting in low damages from one resulting in 
high damages, a risk curve can. In contrast to an expected value approach, a risk curve 
can distinguish between an event with a low probability of occurrence and a severe 
consequence vs. a more frequent but less severe consequence. In our curves, we will 
represent the natural variability or irreducible uncertainty on the ordinate. The epistemic 
uncertainty is represented by error bands of any desired confidence level that surround 
that curve.  
1.3   Catastrophe Models as Integrated Assessment Models 
Evaluation of measures to deal with catastrophes is challenging. It combines available 
historical data with various types of models. Traditional statistical and actuarial models 
are usually insufficient to represent the full range of potential damages a catastrophe 
may inflict on a location in the future. There are several reasons for this.  The first is the 
intrinsic uncertainty in when a catastrophe may strike.  Catastrophes are rare events that 
may occur immediately or may not occur for a thousand years.  There is typically a lack 
of historical data on the occurrence of events in a particular location, though the data 
may be available on at larger spatial scales (e.g., regional or national scales). Thus, in 
our case assessment of risk, analyses are based on catastrophe modeling to gain 
additional information on the range of plausible future outcomes.  
The catastrophe models being examined and developed within the RMS project offer a 
natural setting for applying this expanded conception of risk.  Examination of the use of 
the term "catastrophe model" reveals that such models have evolved from the 
broadening of actuarial approaches for estimating risk to incorporate the modeling and 
probabilistic approaches of the other technical risk perspectives. The distinction 
between catastrophe models and earlier, public-policy oriented simulation models, is 
that (as pointed out by Renn) modeling and PSA approaches have historically been used 
                                                 
3
 The user must simply keep in mind, when comparing two curves on such a plot, that the use of a 
logarithmic scale means that equal divisions on the ordinate represent order of magnitude changes. The 
intuitive understanding of the relative likelihood for a user accustomed to linear plots may be biased to 
exaggerate the likelihood of low probability events if this is not consciously acknowledged. 
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for purposes of standard setting or for improving technological systems. Catastrophe 
models differ in that the results are typically used within a risk-sharing framework such 
as insurance. 
A common element in most catastrophe models is use of decomposition4, a staple 
element in systems-analytic thinking (Raiffa, 1968; Bier et al., 1999). In catastrophe 
modeling, decomposition is implemented by the creation of modules or submodels. 
Many authors [Walker 1997; Kozlowski and Matthewson 1997; Clark 2002; Boyle 
2002] define three modules: A scientific or hazard module comprising an event 
generator and a local intensity calculation, an engineering module for damage 
estimation, and an insurance coverage module for insured loss calculation.  Finally, 
most catastrophe models produce outputs that are distributional. That is, the results are 
typically not simply an expected loss, but rather a full loss distribution curve that may or 
may not follow a particular statistical distribution. Based upon these observations, we 
define catastrophe modeling as a risk-analytic technique that has the following four 
characteristics: 
1) The technique: Catastrophe modeling makes use of simulations rather than purely 
historical actuarial data for purposes of estimating probabilities and outcomes.  One of 
the main reasons for developing a catastrophe model is that there is not enough 
historical data for actuarial estimates.  One must therefore generate data by simulating 
the physical events.  This does not preclude the inclusion of actuarial data: it is enough 
that simulations based on theoretical models rather than statistical analysis of historical 
data be included as a primary element of the analysis.   
2) The structure: Catastrophe models are typically modular, that is, comprised of 
relatively independent sub-models. For example, a "hazard" submodel drives the risk, a 
"loss" submodel estimates some type of loss dependent upon the hazard, and a 
"management" submodel examines the impact of different decisions. The modular 
nature of most catastrophe models is important in that it (a) allows the development of a 
model by interdisciplinary teams and (b) allows, where appropriate, the substitution of a 
simple and computationally inexpensive reduced-form model for a more complex and 
computationally time-consuming mechanistic simulation model. The ability for the 
model to be developed by interdisciplinary teams allows the inclusion of the relevant 
expertise without requiring that all members of the team be experts in all disciplines 
represented in the model. The important element is that all members of the team should 
have an understanding of how to properly interpret the output of the submodels and all 
should understand the ultimate use of the model. The ability to implement 
computationally inexpensive reduced form models - referred to as "catastrophe 
generators" by Ermoliev and co-workers (2000) - allows for the use of numerical 
optimization models that would be analytically intractable and otherwise prohibitively 
expensive in computational resources. 
3) The output: Catastrophe models explicitly include both probabilities and 
consequences (typically purely financial consequences rather than health and safety or 
broader economic consequences). In contrast to many deterministic models or 
probabilistic safety assessments, it does not focus solely on the probability (e.g., the 
reliability of a system) of failure.  In contrast to many actuarial methods, it does not 
                                                 
4
 For a thought-provoking discussion of decomposition, see section 6.4 in Bier et al. (1999). 
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collapse the probability and consequence into a single expected value, but focuses 
attention on the entire combination of probabilities and consequences; namely, the 
probability distribution of consequences.  
4) The use: The main difference between a catastrophe model and a more traditional 
natural hazard risk assessment as applied in public policy analysis is the application. Cat 
models have thus mainly been developed for insurance or risk sharing settings.  This 
contrasts with flood damage reduction analyses, which are often focused on loss 
prevention or loss reduction.   Like the public policy models for natural hazard risk 
assessment described by Petak and Atkisson (1982), catastrophe models are typically 
modular simulation models producing a probability distribution of potential losses. The 
first two elements (a scientific or hazard module comprising an event generator and a 
local intensity calculation, and an engineering module for damage estimation) are 
essentially the same as the first two modules of the public-policy oriented models 
discussed previously. However, a catastrophe model typically extends the public-policy 
model approach by overlaying the exposure of the insurer over the distribution of 
damages to compute potential claims.  In a rather novel application, a catastrophe model 
developed by IIASA for flooding on the Upper Tisza river in Hungary was used to 
illustrate policy impacts of options for a nation-wide insurance program. This proved 
useful at a stakeholder workshop, where the local residents, insurance companies and 
the central government reached a consensus on a policy direction.  (See Ermolieva et al. 
2001; Ekenberg et al. 2003; Brouwers et al. 2003; Linnerooth-Bayer and Väri, 
forthcoming).   
1.4  Catastrophe Modeling and Uncertainty  
Catastrophic risks are low-probability, high-consequences events.  Often, stemming 
from the low probability, they are plagued by major uncertainties. One lesser-developed 
aspect of catastrophe modeling is accounting for epistemic uncertainty. Although many 
catastrophe models are probabilistic, they often include only aleatory uncertainty, 
perhaps reflecting the origin of these approaches within the insurance community.  
However, an explicit consideration of epistemic uncertainty is critically important. 
Physically-based simulation of climate-driven catastrophes is challenging (Petak and 
Atkisson 1982; Minnery and Smith 1996), as models do not yet exist that can synthesize 
accurate predictions of rainfalls, windspeeds, or other climactic phenomenon with 
detailed resolution across the full range of spatial-temporal scales (e.g., from global 
scale to scales on the order of square kilometers and from annual scales to hourly 
scales) necessary for accurate risk analyses.  When the possibility of climate change is 
taken into account, the epistemic uncertainties increase dramatically. Petak and 
Atkisson emphasize that "the results derived from the risk analysis models are not to be 
considered 'fact'. Much uncertainty is associated with the findings generated by the 
models" (p. 186). This statement remains as true today as when it was written twenty 
years ago. Pervasive uncertainties in the underlying science remain. In financial circles, 
this uncertainty is termed "ambiguity", and a high level of ambiguity is a stumbling 
block for the success of insurance programs because of the effect that it has on 
insurability (Kunreuther and Roth 1998, p. 33). One sometimes hears that "uncertainty 
can be reduced by modeling". It is important to recognize that this is not always the 
case.  There is a significant difference between using a model for prediction and using a 
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model for information-structuring.  Using a model for pricing insurance can be difficult 
because it may force the model to be used in predictive mode, where the model may be 
weak.  Models do not necessarily reveal anything new about the world. What they are 
good at doing is structuring the information that is already available, allowing additional 
relevant information to be brought in to bear on a problem. They may not be able to 
reduce uncertainty, though, and in fact they may reveal just how uncertain a situation is.  
The good news is that there is a long experience in risk analysis techniques for dealing 
with uncertainty, and that experience is being brought in to the field of catastrophe 
modeling. Considerable progress has been made in methods for the explicit analysis of 
uncertainty (cf Morgan and Henrion 1990; National Research Council 2000; Bier et al. 
1999; and others).  Model verification and validation exercises can be conducted to 
assist in the quantification of uncertainties in catastrophe models. Furthermore, multiple 
assessments can be carried out. According to Gary Venter of Guy Carpenter, a "...key to 
effective catastrophe modeling is understanding the uncertainties involved...it is critical 
to look at the results from a number of catastrophe models so that we can see what 
range of results would be and how different approaches to a problem could lead to 
different outcomes" (Venter, 2003).  The integrated approach presented in this report 
draws heavily upon one of the authors’ experience with the treatment of uncertainty in 
the field of human health risks from pollutants introduced into the environment as well 
as from approaches developed for characterizing uncertainty in nuclear power plant risk 
assessments (cf. Morgan and Henrion (1990) and Covello and Merkofer (1993)).  We 
are heartened to see that others are beginning to explore this topic as well; for an 
example of an approach similar to ours that examined the uncertainty in flood risks 
along the Rhine River, see Merz et al. (2002).  In addition, there is a long experience in 
producing the so-called robust strategies that do not require precise estimation of all 
uncertainties and risks.  Instead, robust solutions yield solutions against the vast 
majority of uncertainties without the need for a precise evaluation of all all sources of 
uncertainty (see, for example, Ermolieva et al. 1997, Ermoliev et al. 2000, Amendola et 
al. 2000, Digas 1998, Baranov 2003).  
1.5  Motivation for Catastrophe Modeling  
Given the potential costs and uncertainties associated with catastrophe modeling, what 
are the advantages? They are considerable. At a minimum, the use of a distributional 
technique allows a much better characterization of loss possibilities than that embodied 
in the annual expected loss or the probable maximum loss concept.  However, Walker 
(1997) suggests that the true advantage of catastrophe modeling: "...lies in the step 
change described above in the information it provides, not the marginal improvement in 
a single point calculation...the benefits lie in the overall savings arising from an 
integrated approach to risk management". A major advantage of these types of 
integrated models (whether cat models for insurance purposes or public policy models 
commissioned by national or regional governments) is that they can produce outputs 
tailored towards different stakeholders and multiple hazards simultaneously. "The 
primary output ... may be the loss experienced by a single property or facility (single-
site analysis), the aggregate portfolio loss in a particular catastrophe zone (zone 
analysis), or the aggregate portfolio loss for a whole state or country, or worldwide, 
from a particular hazard (specific hazard analysis) or all hazards (multi-hazard 
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analysis)" (Walker, 1997).  The outputs from an integrated model of climate risk and 
seismic risk, for example, could show the distribution of impacts to farmers (both the 
distribution and across the whole sector), to urban dwellers, to insurers, and to the 
governmental treasuries. These distributions of impacts might be the basis for either 
negotiation, optimization, or both. 
To realize these advantages, is it necessary to provide guidance, tools, and practical 
examples for the effective use of the new information within a risk-sharing context. This 
has been explored by Ermoliev and co-workers (2000) for the case of insurers, 
illustrating how catastrophe modeling can lead to improved policies on the part of 
insurers on their coverages of losses and premiums in an environment of spatial and 
temporal dependencies.  By improved policies, the authors suggest some reasonable 
objectives on the part of insurers (profits, stability) and premium holders. Furthermore, 
in contrast to models that are focused on loss prevention or loss reduction, the risk-
sharing orientation of catastrophe models leads naturally to their applicability to 
negotiation processes. The ability of a model to clarify the results of a particular 
decision on the distribution of risks and benefits or to reveal potential unintended 
consequences allows parties to a negotiation to examine how different policies and 
decisions might affect their own interests.  The IIASA Tisza study (see Linnerooth-
Bayer and Väri, forthcoming; Ermolieva et al. 2001; Ekenberg and co-workers, 2003) 
and earthquake risks management (see Amendola et al. 2000, Ermoliev et al. 2000, 
Baranov 2003) examined the use of catastrophe models in the negotiations between 
stakeholders (including citizens, local and national government officials, engineers, and 
insurers) dealing with flood risks on the Tisza River and with policy relevant 
discussions of earthquake risks management for insurance legislation in Italy and 
Russia.  The use of catastrophe models to examine the concrete impacts of different 
concepts of fairness as a tool in negotiations on risk may prove to be one of the more 
novel applications of the technique. 
1.6  Objectives and Structure of the Report 
This report applies these concepts of risk and uncertainty to a concrete case, namely, the 
risk of flooding along the Vienna River in Vienna, Austria. Our goal is to illustrate how 
the techniques discussed above can be applied to the problems of urban flooding, 
thereby extending traditional engineering-based approaches to flood risk management to 
integrate loss spreading techniques, such as the purchase of flood insurance or the 
maintenance of a catastrophe fund, with traditional loss-reduction techniques, such as 
the construction of levees, floodwalls, or detention basins. Furthermore, by representing 
risk using a CCDF, or "risk curve", we illustrate (1) an information rich approach to 
deal simultaneously with probabilities and consequences and (2) the significant 
differences between policy alternatives. Finally, we illustrate how Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques can be used to address both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. 
The remainder of this report therefore focuses on the elaboration of a catastrophe model 
for management of flood risks on the Vienna River that fully addresses the range of 
uncertainties in possible financial losses. We begin with a discussion of the potential 
problems associated with flooding along the Vienna River and identify flooding of a 
subway line as the major area at risk. We then briefly examine case studies of previous 
catastrophic subway floods and use these case studies to develop an empirical model for 
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the estimation of damages from flooding. This model is then integrated with the 
hydraulic analyses prepared by BOKU/IWHW to provide an integrated catastrophe 
model. This model is then used to evaluate a number of different hypothetical mitigation 
options, both structural and financial, for managing flood risks. Emphasis is placed on 
the ability to quantitatively compare the results of different options and the results of 
options integrating both structural and non-structural measures. Both epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty are handled explicitly throughout. The report concludes with a 
discussion of the insights gained by this exercise. 
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2.  Background 
The following discussion is summarized from Faber and Nachtnebel (2003), where 
technical details of the data and models can be found. 
2.1  General description 
The Vienna River is one of the largest rivers in the city of Vienna with a catchment area 
of 230 km2.  As shown on Figure 2.1, the river flows through some of the most densely 
populated districts of the city. The most exposed infrastructure is located along an over 
eight km long reach, namely, the subway line, which is constructed in an open section at 
the right river bank, and the main roads on both sides.  From a hydrological viewpoint, 
flood hazards from the Vienna River are critical due to the large amounts of impervious 
surfaces covering wide parts of the catchment, low geological infiltration capacity, and 
little natural retention. These lead to rapid rises in water level resulting in flash flooding.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Vienna River watershed Map: ÖK 200, BEV (1999) 
Indicated in Figure 2.1 are: 
Watershed with rural (173 km²) and urban character (57 km²) dark blue 
Outlet of the rural catchment for rainfall runoff modeling: Node Halterbach light   blue 
Flood retention reservoirs: Auhof, Mauerbach and Wienerwaldsee light blue 
Gauge Kennedybrücke in the urban river reach black 
   Border Vienna - Lower Austria pink 
The current design of the 12 km urban reach is a stonework and concrete bed and the 
construction of tunnelled river reaches.  This system was constructed between 1895 to 
1915 in parallel with the construction of the city railway.  Two sections of 0.375 and 
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2.156 km were tunnelled. The flood related threat in the city is due to many factors, 
including large channel slopes and flow velocities, rapid increase of discharge and the 
absence of natural retention areas. According to hydraulic estimates and laboratory 
tests, velocities up to 7-8 m/s and supercritical flow conditions in several sections are 
expected during extreme floods. Significant backwaters from arch bridges and tunnelled 
sections, lateral waves of +/- 0.75 meters at 5.5 - 6.5 m/s mean velocity (Grzywienski, 
1965) as well as transverse water surface inclination in bends are expected to occur 
during large floods. 
2.2  Rainfall Characteristics 
As in many small mid-latitude catchments, flooding on the Vienna River is typically 
flash flooding due to small and meso-scale convective storms embedded in large-scale 
systems. These storms are typically of several hours to days duration and generate 
flooding due to the fast watershed responses. Even low hills and mountains can 
intensify storm events in comparison to plain areas by regeneration of convective cells 
(Kelsch, 2001). The orograhpically intensified convective movement of air masses in 
the western hills of the Vienna River basin is also documented in the Austrian 
Hydrographical Atlas (HAÖ, 2003). 
As discussed in the introduction, flood protection tends to rely on the identification of a 
design flood or design rainfall with a specified annual exceedence probability5. 
Applications of design rainfall data in flood protection and urban hydrology often 
employ rain yield or rain depth relations. Intensity-Depth-Frequency (IDF) curves are 
developed for specified regions from fitting mostly exponential functions to recorded 
rainfall aggregates of partial series. Modeling of very rare storms employs design values 
developed from local records or regionalized data. These numbers represent 
conservative estimates of expected values and the parametrical uncertainty is currently 
ignored in design and analysis of rainfall-runoff processes. A temporal change of design 
values can be seen from the one-hour rainfall at Vienna's oldest meteorological station 
Hohe Warte, which increased steadily from 1957 to 2000 (Figure 4.5). It is unclear to 
what relative extent climate change, measurement errors, data processing and 
extrapolation uncertainties have contributed to this increase. According to the Vienna 
hydrographical service (Pekarek, 1998) the precipitation characteristics and recording 
and analysing methods have changed in the latest years so that currently return periods 
cannot be assigned to recently monitored extreme storms.  A re-evaluation of the 
Schimpf criteria and design data, which were widely used in Austria since the early 
seventies, is recommended by the author. These criteria would imply that the 48 hours 
rain-depth of 240mm measured in the hills west of the city (K35-criterion) in July 1997 
exceeded a 1000-year event. There are also concerns about the accuracy of the 
extrapolation of the Lower Austrian series 1901 - 1980 (Lower Austria, 1985). This 
concern has led to efforts to establish new design rainfall data for Lower Austria by 
combining atmospheric models and measurements (Salzer, 2002).  In the discussion of 
                                                 
5
 A simple way to determine the annual exceedence probability is to count the number of years that the 
flood exceeded a certain level and divide that by the total number of observations.  In other words, a flood 
with an annual exceedence probability of 10% is that magnitude of flood that is equaled or exceeded in 
one out of every ten years of observation.  It may then be referred to as the “ten-year” flood, although this 
may be misleading in that  
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design values, attention should be paid to the length of the underlying series, the date of 
establishment (state of the art methodology) and if measurement errors were corrected 
e.g. by increasing the raw data by a certain amount. Design values for the greater region 
around the Vienna River basin were published from the following authors, mainly for 
and from Hohe Warte data. For completeness reasons, publications which are not 
directly relevant for this investigation are also listed. 
Steinhauser (1957): Data of the 1901-1955 series were obtained by the Hellmann 
recorder, selected according to thresholds of half of the Wussow criterion and processed 
with the Reinhold guidelines (Wussow, 1922; Reinhold, 1935). Amounts for rainfall 
durations from 5 minutes to 48 hours are given with a maximum return period of 50 
years for Hohe Warte. 
Schimpf (1970): Values are published for rainfall durations from 30 minutes to 72 
hours. For shorter intervals, the Wussow Formula is recommended. The regional 
classification of Kreps & Schimpf (1965) assigns the K35 criterion to the western 
Viennese area and the Vienna River catchment and the K25 criterion to urban plains and 
the region with moderate hills. The accuracy of these design values is questionable. 
Lower Austrian Federal government (Lower Austria, 1985): This publication uses the 
1901-1980 series and recommends design values up to 48 hours and a exceedence 
probability of 0.01 for different zones. The western Viennese hills and the Vienna River 
catchment are located in the region of 50 - 60 mm mean extreme daily precipitation, 
where the urban areas are in the 40 - 50 mm zone. This database is no longer 
recommended as the values seem too small (Salzer, 2002). It is assumed by experts, that 
an increase by 20 - 40 % leads to more accurate values. 
Auer et al. (1989): Intensity - duration - frequency (IDF) relations are developed for 
Hohe Warte from 5 minute ombrograph aggregates of the partial series spanning 1973 - 
1982 according to DVWK-ATV (1983). From the 10-year series up to 50-year values 
were extrapolated for rain durations from 5 minutes to 30 days. 
Kadrnoska & Adam (1992): Design recommendations for conduits in Vienna are based 
on the maximum annual 15 minutes-rainfall intensity with 105 l/s/ha south-west of 
River Danube and 90 l/s,ha north-east. These values are developed from the 1901-1955 
series (Steinhauser, 1957). Other rain durations and return periods are usually obtained 
by employing the Reinhold (1935 & 1940) coefficients. Reinhold's time-coefficients are 
applicable for return periods up to 20 years. They are normally used as simplified pipe 
design tools.  
Lorenz & Skoda (2000): Design rainfall is calculated by OKM (Orographic Convective 
Model; Lorenz & Skoda, 2000; HAÖ, 2003) using partial series of the ÖKOSTRA 
project (In the city of Vienna, only the Hohe Warte series is long enough) and a 
meteorological prediction model for convective storms with orographic influence. 
Lorenz & Skoda corrected the measurement error by a 5% increase of raw data. The 
orographic influence is accounted by incorporating a 1.5 km raster elevation model. 
Durations range from five minutes to 12 hours and return periods from 0.5 to 100 years. 
The authors recommend two formulas for return periods larger than 100 years and a re-
evaluation of their results when improved convective models and a larger rainfall 
database are available.  Electronic data was obtained from HZB via MA 45.  These 
model data are available for entire Austria and is presently recommended in Lower 
Austria for durations up to 3 hours and return periods up to 100 years. Values for other 
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durations and return periods have been re-evaluated (Salzer, 2002). These numbers are 
also published in the digital Austrian Hydrologic Atlas (HAÖ, 2003). Data represent 
lower limits of maximum convective precipitation inside an area of 6 x 6 km.  
Lower Austrian Federal government (Lower Austria, 2001): A review of the Lower 
Austrian rainfall intensities for the one-year 15-minute storm was published in 2000. It 
shows values from 110 to 120 l/s/ha around the city and up to 130 l/s/ha in the Vienna 
River basin (Lower Austria, 2000).  
ÖKLIM (2001): This database comprises extrapolated rain data of several durations of 
the 1991 to 1999 series of Hohe Warte.  
The increase of the design values over time based on observations is evident by 
comparing Steinhauser (1957), Auer (1989) and ÖKLIM (2001). Higher values due to a 
different model approach are obtained by Lorenz & Skoda (2000).  High values of the 
Lower Austrian series (1980) and Schimpf's data (1970) are explained by the 
geographical location of Hohe Warte on the boundary of two regions. The curves 
represent the higher precipitation class.  This underlines the importance of the spatial 
variability. 
For establishing the design rainfall amounts for flood investigations in Vienna River 
basin and protection reservoir adaptation, an extrapolation from the Lower Austrian 
series (1901-1980) and Schimpf's data was performed by Neukirchen (1995), as 
indicated in Figure 2.2. Both of these analyses were reassessed and it was concluded 
that the storm depths were underestimated. Figure 2.2 comprises the 30 % increased 
values from the Lower Austrian series 1901 - 1980.  It also shows the values proposed 
by Lorenz & Skoda (2000) for the urban Vienna River catchment consisting of a curve 
for return periods up to 100 years and two equations for larger values.  Due to the 
orographic influence, the numbers for the rural Vienna River basin (which are not 
available) might be even larger, but they are currently reevaluated for annual 
probabilities smaller than 0.01 and durations of more than three hours. 
For this study, it is assumed that reliable values fall between the design values and the 
Lorenz & Skoda figures, but there remains a considerable uncertainty concerning the 
design rainfall depth. This uncertainty is expressed by defining the design storm depth 
as a random variable following an extreme value distribution and by explicitly 
considering a normal distributed standard error about the parameters of that distribution.  
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 Figure 2.2: Comparison of 6 hours point design rainfall in the rural Vienna 
River catchment. 
 
As rainfall of a larger areal extension has a smaller intensity as a point rainfall of a 
given frequency, the design rainfall data have to be reduced to obtain estimates for the 
basin precipitation. For the rural (173 km²) and the entire Vienna River catchment (230 
km²), areal reduction factors of 95 to 80 % are found in Maniak (1988), Gutknecht 
(1982) and Lorenz & Skoda (2000). As this reduction applies to all point rainfall design 
values in the same way, it is neglected in the project. 
The Vienna River has a mean annual flow, based on data from 1981 to 1999, of 1.16 
m³/s (HZB, 1999). The maximum discharge was estimated for the 18 May 1851 event 
with 600 m³/s at the outlet of the Vienna River into the Danube (Bauer, 1993).  Some of 
the larger events in the 20th century were estimated at the gauge Kennedybrücke at km 
7.65. Water surfaces have been recorded since 1904 and discharges since 1981. The 
Vienna River has experienced extremely large flows in the past, as illustrated in Table 
2.1 and Figure 2.3. 
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Table 2.1:  Estimates of peak discharges during significant floods at gauge 
Kennedybrücke, km 7.65 
 
Peak discharge 
[m3/s] 
Return Period 
[a] 
Date Reference 
472 70 April 1951 Bauer (1993) 
374 30-35 July 1975 Bauer (1993) 
138 20-25 May 1991 Bauer (1993) 
317  7. July 1997 Neukirchen (1997), according to rating curve 
285 < 50 7. July 1997 Neukirchen (1997), adjusted 
193  7. July 1997 HZB (1999) 
125  21. May 1999 HZB (1999) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Vienna River at km 8 during normal flow conditions and during the 
1975 flood (Source: Gewässerschutzbericht 2002, BMLFUW) 
 
However, problems related to the estimation of the probability of larger discharges 
include undocumented changes in gauge zero before 1958, gradually varying flow 
conditions, and hydraulic jumps (MA 45, 2001a).  Data from 1962 to 1971 is missing. 
As the available gauge series are not very long and reliable, rainfall-runoff models are 
used for design and analysis purposes. For the recent upgrades of the Vienna River 
flood protection system, which started in 1997, catchment models were developed that 
account for rainfall-runoff, routing and storage processes. These models provide flood 
hydrographs entering the urban river reach. The urban storm water runoff is estimated 
and added along the river. It is assumed that the reoccurrence periods of rainfall and 
discharge are equal. Catchment models were established by Neukirchen (1985) with a 
simplified flood control basin performance estimation, IWHW (1988) included a 
hydrologic retention basin model and Neukirchen (1995) established a rainfall-runoff 
model as a basis for the projected real time control system. This model was calibrated 
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by two flood events of 1991. The largest peak discharge and volume at the city's 
entrance were calculated for the six hours storm. The urban runoff contribution is 
calculated with a rainfall-runoff and hydrodynamic transport model (data e.g. in 
Neukirchen, 2000).  
2.3  Elements at risk 
Several elements at risk (EAR) are located in the urban river vicinity. The most 
endangered is the subway line U4 at the right embankment. For 7.5 km, it is situated 
mostly in open sections beside the river before it enters the underground track. A 
partition wall protects the subway line from floods. Portable flood barriers can be 
installed in two locations in order to prevent the overflowing water amounts from being 
conveyed to underground sections of the line that include major subway junctions. 
These emergency measures were installed recently and require a 6-hour lead time for 
installation. At the left embankment main roads are located, together with densely 
populated areas. Various service pipes are placed under the road embankments. 
 
 
Figure 2.4a:   
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 Figure 2.4b:  
Figure 2.4: General situation of the urban Vienna River with the main elements 
at risk. Map: BEV, ÖK50 
 
The construction of the first city railway along Vienna River was started in 1894, and 
opened for the public 1898. It was closed down in 1918 and re-opened as an electric line 
in 1926. The stepwise reconstruction into the current transport system was begun in 
1976 and completed in 1981 (Prillinger, 2000).  There are a variety of failure 
mechanisms that could lead to severe damage to the subway.  The term "overflowing" is 
used for a situation where the mean water level is higher than the wall crest. This 
contrasts with "wave overtopping", which refers to the temporal and spatial oscillations 
of the water surface over the flood wall. Although no past inundation or other flood 
damage to the subway or the embankment has been reported, it is generally agreed that 
wave overtopping and overflowing of the subway wall may occur at floods slightly 
larger than a 100-year event. In case of intensive overflowing and the absence or 
malfunction of the transverse portable flood barriers located at the track at 
Längenfeldgasse (upgraded 2001) and Naschmarkt (since 1999), the U4 subway line 
acts as a flood bypass conveying water downstream to the junctions Längenfeldgasse, 
Karlsplatz and Landstrasse where the tunnels of nearly all connected lines are 
inundated.  
In addition, about one kilometer downstream the Auhof basins, local inundation of both 
embankment roads may occur. 
Another failure mechanism is wall collapse. The masonry subway partition wall was 
constructed about 100 years ago and subsequently restored. During floods, it is 
subjected to hydrostatic and dynamic horizontal water forces and in unfavorable cases 
also to pore water pressure acting in the wall joints and fissures. Considering the wall 
geometry of bends in plan view, the strength depends also on the arch action: Concave 
bends have a slightly higher resistance. Large horizontal forces appear only with 
extreme water levels and the loss of equilibrium may cause rapid overflowing. A final 
failure mechanism is the collapse of embankment wall on either the left or right banks. 
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 Figure 2.5: Subway network and protection measures. Map: 
http://www.metropla.net/eu/vie/wien.htm 
 
The stability of the embankment wall depends on intact subsoil supporting the concrete 
foundation which may be affected by the development of large scours close to the 
foundations. This can happen after the invert material is destroyed by the stream's shear 
force. It is assumed that intensive foundation scouring results in a wall failure leading to 
severe damage on the left embankment and in consequence the conveying capacity will 
be reduced by wall and backfill material. The backwater effects will increase the 
probability of the above mentioned failure modes. If this occurs on the right bank, rapid 
overflowing into the subway line and stations could occur.  
2.4  Flood protection  
Because of the problems discussed above, and because of the desire for an improved 
ecological and recreational character for the river, a suite of activities has been 
identified. An interdisciplinary study (Bauer, 1993) combined ecological and technical 
issues to produce a solution that focuses on reconstructing, extending and adaptively 
controlling the flood protection works. In order to improve flood-carrying capacity of 
the channelized river and to improve water quality, the study further proposes a large 
urban storm water bypass channel below the current riverbed. Urban storm water 
discharges can reach up to 200 m3/s at the mouth of Vienna River in extreme cases 
(Bauer, 1993; MA 45, 1996). This goal of the project is to reduce the 1000-year design 
flood of the rural river basin from its original (pre-1990) value of 475 m3/s to 380 m3/s. 
The entire urban storm water will be conveyed in a bypass channel located in the 
current riverbed. In addition, a forecast-based runoff model for reservoir control will be 
installed and the retention schemes (Figure 5.1) shall be adapted. The Mauerbach and 
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Auhof schemes have been rehabilitated to serve ecological and recreational purposes in 
addition to their flood-protection role. The re-design of the reservoirs was based on 
hydrologic simulations with a rainfall-runoff model that was calibrated by the May and 
August 1991 storms. Future work will focus on rainfall forecast for the real time 
controlled basin operation and the implementation of a warning and basin operation 
system.  
The current situation (March 2003) of the flood protection system in the Vienna River 
basin is characterized by a sequence of partly upgraded detention reservoirs and a 12 km 
channelized urban reach. Both the flood control basins and the urban river reaches were 
engineered from 1895 to 1902. Apart from repairs undertaken over the last century, the 
urban river is mainly in the constructed state of 1900. According to a critical analysis in 
the eighties, the retention basin performance was found insufficient for adequate 
protection requirements as very large hydrograph peaks such the generated 100- and 
1000-year events pass the flood control basins without considerable reduction of the 
flood peak (IWHW, 1988). This was due to an insufficient storage volume and control 
capacity, causing premature basin filling of the Auhof reservoirs by tributaries of the 
adjacent hills and by the increasing branch of the Vienna River hydrograph. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Auhof and Mauerbach retention schemes (MA 45, 1996)  
 
The Auhof flood storage system consists of an upstream basin distributing the discharge 
into the bypass channel or the storage cascade consisting of five basins. During 
upgrading works, completed in 2001, the weir crests were partly heightened and 
hydraulic steel structures were upgraded for adaptive control purposes. The landscape of 
the basins was re-designed under an ecological viewpoint. The Mauerbach basins 
consist of a distribution basin and a storage basin. Similar changes to those implemented 
in Auhof were also conducted at Mauerbach reservoir and were completed in 2001. 
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The Wienerwaldsee is an artificial reservoir with a 13,5 m high barrage that was 
constructed in 1894 for drinking water provision of demand peaks and emergencies of 
up to 24.000 m3 per day (Bauer, 1993). Plans have been drawn up to adapt this basin to 
serve flood control purposes. These include an extension of the barrage and an 
expansion of control capacity. However, as of March 2003, these works have not been 
started. Some of the reasons for this is the fact that other drinking water sources will 
take over its capacity in 2005, and the further utilization of Wienerwaldsee is therefore 
not clear. The options of selling the basin to the adjacent Lower Austrian communities 
or using the basin purely for flood protection purposes have been broadly discussed 
(Kurier, 2002). 
The hydrologic investigations in this study distinguish among several construction 
and operational states of the retention basin system: 
1. Hypothetical natural state without any artificial retention capacity 
2. Reservoir state before beginning of the upgrading works in 1997 
3. Recent (2002) state 
4. Reservoir state after completed upgrading of Auhof, Mauerbach and Wienerwaldsee 
 
The effect of upgrading the protection system from no retention effect to full operation 
of all 3 reservoirs on the 1.000-year design flood peak is demonstrated in the upper and 
middle hydrologic profile from Wienerwaldsee to the mouth in Figure 2.7. The 
remaining discharge in Vienna River in m3/s is colored blue. The lower profile exhibits 
the influence of the urban storm water bypass channel. A detailed description of 
structural and operational basin states can be found in Bauer (1993), MA 45 (1996) and 
Neukirchen (1995; 1996; 1997). 
 
Table 2.2: Projected retention basin storage capacity along Vienna River 
Retention Basin                        Flood storage volume [m3] 
 Neukirchen (1997) Neukirchen (2001) 
Auhof 1,160.000 720.000 
Mauerbach 160.000 160.000 
Wienerwaldsee 520.000 630.000 
Total 1,840.000 1,510.000 
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 Figure 2.7: Hydrological profile of the 1.000-year design peak discharge (MA 45,1996) 
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3.  Hydraulic Assessment Model Development 
The following discussion has been adapted from the discussion in Faber et al. (2003) 
and summarizes the work described in much greater detail in Faber and Nachtnebel 
(2003). Technical details of the data and models used can be found in that reference. 
The objective of the hydrologic and hydraulic analysis was to come up with an estimate 
of the frequency of failure of the investigated protection system and to give an 
approximation of the severity of a failure event. These are intended as inputs to the 
IIASA catastrophe model. Uncertainties in the input data are processed by Monte-Carlo 
methods. 
3.1  Stochastic Hydraulic Model - Summary Description 
For modeling the watershed hydrology, the rainfall depth that was sampled for a defined 
return period is transferred into a peak discharge by stepwise deterministic relations for 
different constructional and operational detention reservoir states. These transfer 
functions were derived from rainfall-runoff models for the rural and the urban river 
reach (Neukirchen 1995 & 2000). The uncertainty in these models is not included in the 
Monte Carlo approach. The estimation of relevant flow parameters was carried out with 
a modified version of the hydraulic 1D-steady flow model HEC-RAS (HEC, 2001). The 
HEC-RAS code computes water levels by accounting for sub- and supercritical flow 
conditions, backwater effects from channel constrictions and transverse water surface 
inclination in bends. The computational kernel of HEC-RAS was used within a Monte 
Carlo simulation framework to assess the probability of failure conditional on user-
defined return periods. In addition to the peak discharge described above, several basic 
random variables were introduced in the Monte-Carlo simulations in order to 
incorporate uncertainties in the channel roughness, the river cross-section station and 
elevation and the energy loss due to bridge constrictions. From the output of each 
hydraulic model-run, the occurrence of several possible flood-induced failure modes 
was evaluated. These failure types comprise overflowing, structural damages like 
tipping of a flood wall, scouring of the river bed and collapsing of river bank structures. 
If a deterministic analysis is performed with expected values, the structural failure 
modes will not occur. However, the goal of this section is to introduce parametric 
uncertainties that may result in system failure at river flow rates close to, but not 
exceeding, the design flow. 
The system of equations describing water level as a function of channel parameters and 
river flow rate is too complex to propagate uncertainties analytically. Therefore, Monte-
Carlo simulations are performed by sampling inputs to the hydraulic model to provide 
empirical conditional probabilities of failure P(F|Tr), given specified return periods Tr = 
t (e.g. t = 50 or 100 years). A failure curve, indicated in Figure 3.2 a) is fitted to the data 
points in order to obtain a continuous function. The simulated events have different, but 
well defined return periods which represent the basic inequality for developing the 
weighting function of each simulated scenario: The probability of a variable X being 
larger or equal to a defined value x indicated by the return period Tr=t:  
       
( ) ( )xxXP ττ 1=≥                                                                                        (3.1) 
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As the equality P(X = xt) is usually described by a probability density function, which is 
not known, a numerical solution with Dt = 1 year is performed. Equation 3.2 is used as 
the weighting function assigned to the conditional probability described by the failure 
curve. 
            ( ) ( ) ( )11111 +=+−≅=== ττττττ rTPxXP                                         (3.2) 
a) Conditional probability of failure P(F|Tr) 
b) Weighting function for conditional probabilities of failure P(Tr = t) 
The total probability concept (e.g. in Ang & Tang, 1975; Plate, 1993) is used for the 
integration of all conditional probabilities weighted by their occurrence probability and 
gives an estimate of the probability that the system fails in one year:  
            
( ) ( ) ( )∑∞= +== 1 11τ τττrTFPFP                                                                 (3.3) 
For the failure assessment, basic random variables are introduced describing the 
water pressure in the flood wall, the critical river bed material’s shear stress and the 
scour depth and centre for the failure mechanism. Further, the partly blocked flow 
profile due to collapsed bank structures and backfill material is explicitly modeled by a 
randomly changed cross section geometry.  
3.2  Stochastic Hydraulic Model - Parameters 
3.2.1  Design storm depth parameters 
The storm depth is modeled by a Gumbel distribution. The required parameters for this 
distribution are the mean value and standard deviation sN. Parameters have to be 
estimated from design recommendations, consisting of few N(Tr) points for the given 
storm duration as the underlying record series are not available. The parameters were 
estimated by manually fitted curves in Figure 3.1, and the discussion on the accuracy of 
design values the preceding sections. Table 3.1 gives an orientation for the parameter 
estimation: 
Table 3.1:  Expected annual six hour storm depth 
 Lorenz (2002) Schimpf (1970) Lower Austria (1985) 
N(Tr = 1a) 32.8 mm 27 mm 28.51 mm 
 
The assumed parameters are = 29.44 mm and sN = 16.75 mm, indicated by the black 
lines in Figure 3.1 The extrapolated values represent expectations based on potentially 
erratic data and a limited sample size, therefore a measure of uncertainty is developed.  
For a numerical solution, the basic variable sx is estimated by E(sN) in order to express 
sE. Table 6.4 and Figure 3.1 show the total scattering and its components.  
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 Table 3.2: Estimated parameters and Gumbel statistics 
 
Table 3.2 exhibits expected values NTr, data scattering sE due to limited sample size n 
and raw data error K(Tr)ssN, and sNTr. Curves indicating +/- 2sNTr (95.4% confidence 
interval) are indicated.  For modeling purposes, similar results can be achieved in a 
simplified way by representing all uncertainties by the standard error sE(Tr). In order to 
achieve corresponding plausible scattering, the underlying sample size is reduced to n = 
30. The mean value is estimated to 29.44 mm, the standard deviation is chosen 
manually to 15.7 mm. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Simplified Gumbel parameters and extrapolated rain-depth values. 
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 Figure 3.1: Design values of 6 hours storm depth in Vienna River catchment 
with fitted model curves according to Table 6.5: Expectation +/- 2 sE  
 
The standard error sE obtained in Table 3.3 corresponds to 12, 15 and 16% of the 
expected NTr of the 10, 100 and 1,000 year event respectively. Nobilis (1990) estimated 
a standard deviation of 15% of the expected extreme rainfall in Austria. DWD (1997) 
and Skoda (2003) report similar deviations for Germany and 24-rainfall in Lower 
Austria. As the expectations and confidence intervals of the simplified and the detailed 
uncertainty investigation diverge by less than 1 and 5 mm respectively, the simplified 
approach is implemented in the hydraulic FORTRAN-model developed by Faber and 
Nachtnebel (2003).  
3.2.2  Rainfall - runoff transfer 
The concept for transferring the storm depth into a rural and an urban contribution was 
discussed in a preceding section. The storm depth-peak discharge relations implemented 
in this study are mostly derived from the calibrated catchment model for the rural river 
basin (Neukirchen, 1995) and from a hydrodynamic urban runoff model, which can 
handle the conduit network when it is loaded over its capacity (Neukirchen, 2000). As 
both projects provide barely information on some discrete events and the underlying 
models are not available, the continuous curves comprise assumed data points beyond 
the conventional design calculations and use linear interpolation. The assumed data 
points were obtained via the rain depth-peak discharge gradient in Figure 3.2. Table 6.6 
presents a summary of the employed quantities of the six hours storm depth and the 
rural and urban peak discharges.  
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 Figure 3.2: Storm depth-peak discharge transfer curve for the 6 hours rainfall in 
the rural Vienna River watershed at node Halterbach 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Gradient DQ(N)/DN from rainfall-runoff simulations (Neukirchen, 
1995) with runoff coefficients y(N) 
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The rain depth-peak discharge curve at node Halterbach, the lowest node of the 
hydrologic model, for the system state without retention basins is extended by a peak 
runoff coefficient of y = 79.6 % (v. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). This value is assumed 
constant due the steady precipitation losses of saturated soils. The magnitude 
corresponding to DQ/DN = 6,38 m3/s per additional 1 mm precipitation in 6 hours in 
the 173 km2 watershed is determined as the peak flow increase between the simulated 
118 and 134 mm/6h scenario. The rain depth-discharge curve at Halterbach for the 
system state before retention basin adaptation is extended by a peak runoff coefficient 
of 65.5%. This number is smaller than the former due to the natural storage in the 
uncontrolled reservoirs. It refers to DQ/DN = 5.25 m3/s,mm in 6 which is the peak 
discharge increase between the simulated 118 and 134 mm/6h scenario. The curves 
representing the completed adaptation and the assumed current state at Halterbach are 
supposed to converge to the natural storage relation when rain depths become much 
larger than the designed controllable capacity. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Transfer curves of storm depth and reduced discharge for the urban 
Vienna River catchment and the 6 hours rainfall. Curves represent different 
river stations. 
 
 
The relations for the urban runoff were extended by using the mean peak runoff 
coefficient of the 118 to 134 mm segment of the five curves indicated in Figure 3.4. Due 
to the dependency of rural and urban rainfall, only a reduced amount of the urban runoff 
accounts for the design events of given return periods. The numbers in Figure 3.4, 
resulting from hydrodynamic urban rainfall-runoff simulations and the decrease to 70% 
are established by Neukirchen (2000). Table 3.4 shows a summary of the employed 
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rain-depth - peak discharge relations for the rural and the urban catchment and their 
design return periods. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of 6 hours rain depth - peak discharge relation 
3.2.3  Probability of failure 
The hydrologic/hydraulic simulations for the conditional probability of failure indicated 
in Figure 3.5 cover scenarios of 12 return periods Tr and different states of the flood 
control reservoirs: The difference of a small shift in the fitted failure curves stems from 
activating Wienerwaldsee reservoir for active flood storage. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Conditional probability of failure for the current (l.) and the projected state 
of the flood control reservoirs. Crosses denote simulated data points; curves are fitte to 
obtain continuous functions.  A) Logarithmic.  B) Lognormal 
 
The failure curves in Figure 3.5 are a three-branched logarithmic (LOG) and a 
cumulative log-normal function (LN) which are processed with the total probability 
concept into the probability of failure. The small deviation of P(F) of the state before 
upgrading the retention schemes Auhof and Mauerbach and the current state can be 
explained by hydrologic simplifications, the crude underlying data assumptions and by 
the unintended smoothing effect of curve fitting.  
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 Figure 3.6: Total probability of failure for different structural and operational 
retention basin states 
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4.  Damage Assessment Model Development 
The objective of Chapter 4 is to develop an empirically justified approach to modeling 
financial losses from flooding of subways. Here, we only consider direct tangible 
damages. This is carried out via a two-pronged approach. The first approach is to 
examine past instances of catastrophic flooding of subways. The second approach is to 
examine and extend analytical approximations that were employed by Neukirchen 
(1994) based on expert judgment, to estimate the losses from a catastrophic flood. These 
approaches are then compared and harmonized to develop an empirically justified 
model for estimating the damages. A major advantage of the review of past cases is that 
an approximation of the uncertainty in the results can be developed by looking at the 
ranges of damages in previous major floods. 
It is clear that damages to a subway system would be function of many variables, 
such as: 
• the length of track flooded;  • the level of standing water in the stations and along the rails;  • the duration of the inundation (e.g., electrical systems may be designed to 
withstand short periods of rain but would fail when completely submerged 
for periods of hours or days);  • the velocity of the water (e.g., a slow rise in water level may not damage 
ballasted track, whereas a high velocity current may scour ballast and 
foundations.); 
• the amount of warning time available to take mitigation measures (e.g., 
operating protection systems, installing additional pumping capacity, 
removing high-value equipment such as computers, etc.);  • The composition of the floodwaters (e.g., salt water, silt-laden water, etc.):  • Others not identified above.  
Unfortunately, data do not exist to adequately characterize the quantitative relationship 
between all of these factors and the damage expected after a flood. The situation is 
similar in this regard to the long-standing practices in potential flood damage 
assessment, which is able to use only a subset of all possible contributory factors to 
estimate flood damage. In this report, an approach to damage estimation will be used 
that is conceptually similar to that of the use of depth-damage curves for flood damage 
assessment [Penning-Roswell et al, 1977, N’Jai et al., 1990; Davis and Skaggs, 1992]. 
The basic approach to estimating the flood damage during flooding of the subway is to 
presume that there is a relationship between the length of track flooded and the resulting 
direct damages, as carried out by Neukirchen (1994). This relationship can be expressed 
as follows: 
                                                                                                           (4.1) LDD ⋅α=
where 
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DD is the direct damage, 
L is the length of track flooded, and α is the relationship between the two variables. 
Because we were unable to obtain adequate empirical data on the effect of other factors, 
and because we wanted to connect the output of the hydraulic model to the damage 
estimation model, we evaluated the impact of the magnitude of the flooding by 
introducing a modifying factor to adjust the damage estimates produced by Equation 
4.1. The modifying factor is defined as a function of the rate (m³/s) of overflowing 
water.  ( )goverflowinQf=β                                                                                               (4.2) 
where β is the damage multiplier, and 
Qoverflowing is the rate at which water enters the subway system due to overtopping or 
wall failure 
Because there was no information available to evaluate this function, it was 
implemented in the model by the use of a constrained engineering judgment. It was 
presumed that the results of Equation 4.1 represent reasonable worst case damages and 
the modifying factor is defined on the interval (0,1). For convenience, we choose an 
exponential function of the form  
goverflowinQe
λβ −−=1                                                                                             (4.3) 
This functional form has the advantage of being continuously differentiable and of 
rising to close to the maximum at a rate controlled by the constant lambda. In order to 
evaluate a conventional value for lambda, previous analyses by Neukirchen (1994) were 
evaluated on the basis of engineering judgment.  It was presumed that the platforms are 
rather quickly inundated after water begins flowing into the subway channel. We 
presume that damages begin to be incurred at a rate of 20 m³/s  and that an overflowing 
water discharge of 63 m3/s is sufficient to lead to significant damage in the subway 
system.  The water level in downstream subway stations was modeled for this flow rate, 
and it was shown that the water level would inundate platforms by significant amounts 
(0.5 - 2 m.) . Based upon this, we presume that a level close to the "maximum" level of 
damage (damage percentages corresponding to the complete inundations experienced by 
Taipei, Prague, and Boston) are reached at flow rates slightly higher than 63 m3/s. We 
therefore choose lambda to yield 50% of the maximum at a flow rate of 20 m³/s. 
The rather simplistic manner in which this factor is treated should not be taken as an 
indication that this is trivial. This factor is very important in the integrated assessment in 
that it is the point of linkage between the output of the hydraulic model (Faber and 
Nachtnebel 2003) and the damage model. As will become apparent, the results of our 
model are not particularly sensitive to the functional form of this factor. This is due to 
the nature of the floods faced by the system under study. Flash floods which result in 
rapid rises in water level to the level resulting in maximum damage tend to reduce this 
to a binary 0/1 variable. This may not be the case in other systems, in which the system 
reliability may attenuate flows or in which the elements at risk have the ability to absorb 
exposure to the hazard before reaching 100% failure. Application of the approach 
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presented in this report would require a careful consideration of the appropriate form for 
this factor. 
The final form of the damage equation is therefore ( )LeDD goverflowinQλα −−= 1                                                                                   (4.4) 
It is important to note that this procedure yields only a crude approximation to the actual 
damages. The use of such a simple approximation inevitably introduces large 
uncertainties in the resulting calculated damages. However, there is insufficient data to 
adequately quantify the results of the other factors. The examination of actual case 
studies, and the explicit evaluation of the uncertainties, is thus a critical part of any 
analysis such as this. 
With this approach in mind, we turn our attention to the development of an appropriate 
value for alpha and its attendant uncertainties. We will do this by a review of case 
studies and by examination of the approach implemented by Neukirchen (1994). 
4.1  Case Studies 
A review of news reports was carried out to identify cases of flooding on subways. 
There have been a number of cases of flooded subways reported in the last decade. In 
December 1992, a powerful storm near New York City resulted in coastal flooding that 
inundated the Hoboken Terminal of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp (PATH). 
Approximately 1 km of the PATH tunnel was flooded (Beardsley, 1993). In June 1999, 
heavy rainfall resulted in the inundation of several subways in the city of Fukuoka, 
Japan, due to the sudden overtopping of the Mikasa River (Toda and Inoue, 2002). On 
17 December 1999, the subway system in Caracas (Venezuela) was shutdown as a result 
of flooding (Jones, 1999). Several days of rain in Chile in June 2000 shut down the 
subway systems in Santiago and Valparaiso (UPI, 2000). However, damages from these 
cases were not reported.  
There have been at least four cases in the past decade where floods were reported to 
have caused direct damages (repair costs) of greater than 10 million euro and service 
outages of more than a week. Two of the most severe cases occurred during the course 
of this study. These cases (Boston, October 1996; Seoul, May 1998; Taipei, September 
2001; and Prague, August 2002) will be described below. 
4.1.1  Boston, Massachusetts, USA 
The Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority operates four rapid transit lines comprising 
100 km in the metropolitan Boston area known locally as the "T". One of these, which 
includes the oldest subway system in the United States, is the 40 km Green Line (so 
named because it runs along the park system designed by Frederick Law Olmstead 
known as the "Emerald Necklace" of Boston). 
On the weekend of October 19-20 1996, a powerful storm system delivered over 250 
mm of rain in Massachusetts over a period of two days.  The rainfall caused a tributary 
of the Charles River known as the Muddy River to overflow its banks near its junction 
with the Charles River. This, combined with the backing-up of the local drainage 
systems due to the high river stage in the Muddy River, caused floodwaters to enter the 
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subway system between the Kenmore Square and Hynes Convention Center / ICA stop.  
The majority of the damages were associated with the 53,000 m3 of water that filled the 
Kenmore Square Station to a depth of over seven meters. Other less-flooded stations 
included Symphony, Prudential, Hynes, Copley, and Arlington. The total length of track 
flooded was approximately 2-3 km. [Brown, 1996 a, 1996b; CDM 2001; Moore and 
Chiasson 1996; Mercurio 2002]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Images from flooded Kenmore Square Station.  Photo Credits:   
WBZ-TV/CBS,  WLVI-TV/WB,  John Tlumacki  (Boston Globe)  
The design flood standard of the Boston metro was not reported, although the storm was 
reported to be an approximately 200-year event. Damage was quite extensive. Damaged 
items included track switch motors, signaling systems, power distribution systems, 
tracks, and escalators. Much of the system was restored to operation within a week, 
although signalling and track switching was done manually for some time due to the 
loss of the electrical and communication systems. No deaths or injuries were reported.  
The total damage was estimated to possibly exceed $10 million, and the total cost of 
upgrades to the signaling system was over $30 million. A portion of the repair and 
upgrade costs were to be financed by the federal government through the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. (Brown 1996a, 1996b; Mercurio, 2002) 
An interesting aspect of the Kenmore Square flooding is the failure of a portable 
floodbarrier system that had been installed after a catastrophic flood in 1962 (Mercurio, 
2002; Moore, 1997).  Although the slots for a barrier had been installed, the boards used 
to block the system could not be located in time to prevent the floodwaters from 
entering the station. Although sandbags were places to try to prevent waters from 
entering the station, the efforts failed, as they had in 1962. The revised operating plan 
calls for provisions to adequately secure the boards used to complete the floodbarrier, 
including keeping the boards "under lock and key near the tunnel entrance". The 
temporary system has been installed on four different occasions since the 1996 floods 
(Mercurio 2002).  
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4.1.2  Seoul, South Korea 
Subway line Seven, owned and operated by the Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit 
Corporation, links northeast and southwest Seoul. Construction on line 7 began in 1994 
and was completed in 2000 at a total cost of 868.4 billion won (approximately 800 
million euro). The total line comprises 42 stations over a distance of 45 km between the 
Jangam and Onsu Stations (Korea Times, 2000).  
A review of press reports yielded relatively little data on the flooding that damaged the 
line on May 2, 1998. The flooding occurred when retaining walls installed at a 
construction site on subway line six installed along the Chungnang Stream were 
breached at 7:30 in the morning during a heavy rainfall. The water flowed into the 
Taenung Station on line seven nine minutes later, and proceeded to inundate eleven 
stations over a length of approximately 11 km with approximately 800,000 m³ of water. 
The primary damage was to flooded electric facilities and communication systems. The 
damages were reported to amount to approximately 45 billion won (approximately $35 
million). Line seven was completely out of operation for nine days, and was operated at 
reduced capacity for a further 35 days. The line suffered a decline in ridership of 
approximately 40% (from 500,000 to 300,000 commuters per day) as a result of the 
reduced capacity. (Korea Times 1998a, 1998b).  
4.1.3  Taipei, Taiwan  
The Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation (TRTC), a joint stock company primarily 
financed (74%) by the Taipei City government, operates six subway lines which total 
66.7 km of track in the Taiwanese capital city of Taipei (http://www.trtc.com.tw/).  
On September 16-17 2001, Typhoon Nari produced 425 mm of rain over Taipei , 
causing the worst flood in over 400 years (Chang 2001). The rains caused extensive 
flooding of the metro, resulting in the suspension of operation of all subway lines with 
the exception of the elevated Mucha line (Hsu 2001). The heavy rains flooded the 
control center in the basement of the Taipei Main Station, the Kunyang Station, and 
damaged the "third rail" between the Pannan and Longshan Temple Station on the 
Pannan line. The flooding of the main railway station occurred twelve hours after the 
flooding of the Kunyang Station. The floodwaters entered at the Kunyang station and 
through a 6 m² hole in the basement of the Chunghsaio-Fuhsing station. The hole in the 
basement of the Chunghsiao-Fuhsing station apparently was an overlooked construction 
item, as the hole should have been closed when construction was completed. However, 
the contractor had failed to fill in the opening as required (Chuang 2001). Attempts to 
sandbag the high point in the line at the YungChun station were unsuccessful, and the 
floodwaters entered the Taipei Main Station at 11:45 AM on September 17. The MRT 
Control Station is located in the third lower level of the Taipei main station, and the 
computer servers and power supply are located on the fourth lower level. By 1400 the 
floodwaters from the main railway line had also entered the Taipei Main Station. By 
late afternoon the control center had to be abandoned. Approximately 30% of the 
computers and screens were lost, and all of the power supplies and cables (Kearns 
2001).  
The line between Kuting and Nanshihchiao was reopened on September 20, and the 
north-south Tamsui-Hsientien line was back in limited operation on October 1 with the 
exception of the Shuanlien stop and the Taipei Main Station. The Panchiao-Nankang 
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line between Hsinpu and Hsimen was restored to operation on October 14, with the 
Hsiaonanmen extension opening on October 17. By October 14, the system was up to 
58% of its pre-typhoon daily average of 900,000 passengers per day. The line between 
Hsimen and Chunghsiao-Fuhsing was reopened on October 27 [Shu-Ling, 2001]. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Cleanup and repair work on the MRT Photo credits: George Tsorng, 
Taipei Times 
The design standard for flood protection of the Taipei metro was a 200-year flood event, 
which was exceeded by Typhoon Nari. According Kuo Tsai-ming, deputy director of 
the TRTC, the most affected systems were "communications equipments, escalators, 
fire safety equipment, the drainage system, and the wire and ventilation systems 
installed in the ceiling" (Shu-Ling 2001). Another report indicates that the repair of the 
electrical systems was "by far the most daunting task" (Chou 2001). No deaths or 
injuries were reported as a result of the subway flooding, although approximately 100 
persons were killed during the typhoon, mainly as a results of mudslides in the north of 
Taiwan.  
Reports of the estimated direct repair costs for the flooded subway ranged between €66-
140 million (NT$2-4 billion) damage (Kearns, 2001; Surenkok 2001). A final report on 
the total repair bill was lowered to $53 million, due to cost savings associated with 
"donations of construction materials and reduced prices from companies not wanting to 
be seen making a profit from the typhoon's aftermath" (ref). Funding for repairs were 
sought from the municipal Department of Rapid Transit Systems, which sought to raise 
such funds from both the central government as well as from "austerity measures" from 
other municipal bureaus and departments (Shu-Ling, 2001). Insurance was not in place, 
as the system is insured only against fire and lightning damage. According to Lee Po-
Wen, chairman of the TRTC, the system was not insured against typhoons due to the 
high annual premium costs of €3.3 million, or NT$100 million per year (Kearns, 2001).  
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4.1.4  Prague, Czech Republic  
The Prague metro, built in the 1970s and 1980s and operated by the Prague Public 
Transit Co. Inc, consists of three lines covering fifty kilometers with 51 stations 
(ww.dp-praha.cz).  Daily ridership is approximately 1.2 million.  Because the system 
was also designed to serve as a fallout shelter, many stations were built with steel doors 
designed to seal off the stations in the event of either floods or nuclear attack 
(Krushelnycky, 2002).  
In August 2002, the Bohemian basin received two exceptionally heavy periods of 
rainfall as a result of a slow moving tropical depression. The first occurred between 
August 6 and 7. The second period occurred between August 11 and 13 (www.praha-
mesto.cz/povoden). In Prague, the Vltava river began to rise on August 12. On August 
14, the river rose rapidly and overflowed its banks (Kikuchi and Sasaki 2002). The low-
lying Karlin district was the most severely affected. Although barricades were erected, 
the water level exceeded the 1 m height of the barricades, and entered into the Florenc, 
Krizikova, Invalidovna, and Palmovka stations on the B line in the Karlin district and 
into the Nadrazi Holesovice subway/train station on the C line (Metrostav, 2002). 
Because of the depth of the subway lines, water cascaded through the tunnels, flooding 
approximately seventeen stations (see figure 4.3) over a distance of approximately 20 
km. Although the flooding appeared first on the B line, the underlying A line was 
flooded when a wall collapsed in the Mustek Station, which is common to both the A 
and B lines. One station (Florenc) was reported to be inundated to a depth of 35 m, with 
two trains remaining on the tracks (Carey 2002). Over one million m³ of water was 
pumped out of the system (Konviser 2002).  The return period of the water levels in the 
Vltava were estimated to correspond to 500 year flow. The peak flow rate during the 
flood was estimated as 5,300 m3/s, which compares to a annual average flow of 145 
m3/s and a 100 year return flow of 3,700m3 per second (http://www.praha-
mesto.cz/povoden/) 
The metro was at least partially insured by Ceska Kooperativa (Insurance Letter, 2002). 
Approximately 100 million of a European Investment Bank loan was earmarked for 
repair costs to the metro (CNA 2002). The loan was a thirty year loan with a seven year 
grace period (EIB 2002).  There was considerable controversy surrounding the flooding 
of the metro. It was reported that the emergency door in the Invalidovna station failed, 
flooding the other stations.  A complicating factor appears to be that the metro was kept 
running as the waters rose, due to forecasts which predicted flood peaks considerably 
lower than those actually observed. 
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 Figure 4.3: Extent of Flooding in Prague Metro (source: 
http://metro.mysteria.cz/povoden.swf) 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Damage in the Prague Metro Photos from 
http://tom.vlakpage.cz/index.htm 
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4.1.5  Summary 
A summary of the damages resulting from flooding on subways is given below. 
Table 4.1: Summary of Reported Damages in Subway Flooding Incidents 
M€ Boston, 1996 Seoul, 1998 Taipei, 2001 Prague, 2002 
Total System Cost N/r 790* 15,000** N/r 
Total Construction cost per km N/r 18 ~180 N/r 
Km Track Flooded 02/03/03 11 9 - 12 15-20 
Amount of water (thousand m³) 53 800  (n/r) >1,000 
Reported Flood damage ~10 40 60-140 66-240 
Computed damage per km 1.3-4 ~3.6 0.9-12 4.44-16 
*Line 7 only 
**Entire system (86 km) 
Damages were reported to be primarily associated with electrical/electronic components 
such as power supply systems, communications and signaling, escalators, ventilation, 
etc. Systems were typically completely out of operation for weeks to months and were 
operated on the basis of temporary measures (manual signaling, etc) for up to several 
months. Although there was significant loss of life during the events in Taiwan and 
South Korea, none of this were reported to be due to flooding on the subway6. Reported 
deaths during these events were primarily associated with mudslides, drowning in 
swollen rivers, and electrocution from damaged electrical equipment. A common 
feature in all of these reported episodes was that human errors were contributory factors, 
and were major factors in some cases. These errors ranged from overly optimistic 
hydraulic forecasts to incomplete or inadequate construction methods and the failure to 
install or implement protective actions. We note that an evaluation of the reliability of 
any active system requiring human input or control should include a reliability of the 
operators. For some protective systems, especially those requiring a high degree of 
reliability, human error may turn out to be the most significant limiting factor in the 
reliability of the system. 
With this information, we may estimate alpha on the basis of a statistical analysis of the 
rather limited data. In order to estimate the damage factor, a full factorial design on 
track length flooded and damage estimates was used to generate all possible 
combinations of damage reported and track length flooded. This results in the following 
table:  
Table 4.2:  Range of Length Flooded/Damage ratios 
 Boston 1996 Seoul 1998 Taipei 2001 Prague 2002 
Length Flooded (km) 2 2 3 3 11 12 12 9 9 20 20 20 15 15 15 
Repair Cost (M€) 10 40 10 40 35 140 53 140 53 66 180 240 66 180 240
alpha 5.0 20 3.3 13 3.2 12 4.4 16 5.9 3.3 9.0 12 4.4 12 16 
 
A simple analysis of these values yields a mean of 9.4 and a range from 3.2 to 20. 
However, in order to avoid artificially weighting the cases where there were additional 
estimates (e.g., Prague), synthetic data points were generated as by taking the arithmetic 
                                                 
6
 However, Toda and Inoue (2002) report that an employee of a restaurant located in an underground 
space died when trapped by the floodwaters during the 1999 Fukuoka subway flood in Japan. 
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average of the length flooded and the repair costs.  An appropriate number of these 
synthetic centroids was used (five for Seoul and two for Boston and Taipei) to ensure 
that all cases were equally weighted. A simple arithmetic average is then 8.1. 
A regression was performed to evaluate alpha for the overall data set and shown in 
Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Relationship between Reported Damages and Length Flooded 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Length/Damage Ratios 
To estimate the range, we examined a frequency distribution, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
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4.2  Analytical/Cost-Estimation Approach 
A second approach is to decompose the subway system into major systems (e.g., track, 
communication systems, power systems, etc.) and estimate the percent damage to the 
different systems as a result of inundation. This approach is similar to the approach 
developed in the FLAIR report (N’Jai et al. 1990) and others to develop synthetic depth 
damage curves. If the linear cost of these systems (cost per kilometer as constructed) is 
known, the appropriate percentages can be multiplied by replacement cost to yield a 
total damage per length. 
In Neukirchen (1994), the damage estimation makes the assumption that the damages 
could be estimated using a range of 10% of the construction costs and 15-20% of the 
electrical costs. According to (Laver and Schneck 1996), as-built costs for for subway 
systems in the US are as follows: 
Table 4.3: Reported Costs of Subway Components (M$) from Laver and Schneck (1996) 
Component Median Average Stdev Range 
Systems* 1.9 2.4 1.2 1.4 - 5.4 
At-Grade Components 
At Grade-Ballast Guideway 1.7 3.9 5.4 1.2 - 17.9 
At-Grade Center Platform 
Station 
9.3 9.0 5.1 4 - 19 
At-Grade Side Platform Station 7.4 7.2 0.5 7 - 7.6 
Underground Components 
Underground Guideway  21 24 11 16 - 52 
Subway Center Platform Station 29 28 13 8 - 59 
Subway Side Platform Station 24 24 3 20 - 27 
* Systems represent primarily electrical and electronic components 
Assuming that stations are located at intervals of approximately 1 km, the total cost of at 
grade systems average 9M$ per km and range from 8-42 M$ per km, whereas the 
average total cost of subway systems are 48 M$ per km and range from 25-120 M$ per 
km. Electrical systems comprise approximately 38% of the total systems and guideway 
cost for at grade systems but only 9% for subway systems (presumably reflecting the 
larger component due to excavation costs). Presuming that these ratios can also be used 
to characterize the ratio of electrical installation/total installation costs of stations, we 
find that the electrical components are approximately 2.4M$ for subway systems vs 3.1 
M$ for at grade systems).  One would, a priori, expect these to be similar.  By way of 
comparison, it appears that the Vienna metro is rather expensive. The overall estimated 
construction cost was given as ranging from 44-145 M€ per km with the estimated 
construction cost of the U4 between Ober St. Veit and Kettenbruckengasse (roughly 
speaking, an at-grade system) given as 58 M€ per km7. This is above the range reported 
by Laver and Schneck (1996) for the United States. The reason could be due to 
inappropriate exchange rates and also to the lack of inclusion of soft-costs and special 
costs, such as land acquisition, utility relocations, and various engineering design and 
                                                 
7
 The rates were originally given in schillings, which were pegged at at 13.7603 öS per euro in 1999. 
Because the euro did not exist in 1993, when these estimates were provided, the cost is converted at the 
official rate adopted when the euro was adopted. The range was given as 600 million to 2 billion 
schillings per km, with the cost on the U4 between Ober St. Veit and Kettenbruckengasse as 800 M€ per 
km. 
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management costs. In addition, labor and tax costs may also vary significantly between 
Austria and the US.  
If we assume that the electrical components comprise approximately 40% of the cost of 
at-grade systems, and that the damages to electrical systems are approximately 15-20% 
of construction costs and damages to constructions are approximately 10% of 
construction costs, then we obtain a damaged fraction ranging from 11-14% of 
construction costs for at grade systems and 10-11% for subway systems. Using these 
ranges, and applying these values to the ranges reported above in Laver and Schneck 
(1996) for at grade systems, we obtain a range of 0.9-6 M$ per km.  Application to 
subway systems yields 2.8-17 M$ per km.  One can perform a similar exercise for costs 
associated with the Vienna metro. 
Table 4.4:  Ranges of Damage per Kilometer flooded, Method 2 
  Damage Percent Total Costs 
At Grade 8-42 M$ 10%-14% 0.8 - 6 M$ 
Subway 25-120 M$  10%-11% 2.5 - 13 M$ 
Vienna, at grade 58 M€ 10%-14% 5.8-8.1 M€ 
Vienna, subway 44-145 M€ 10%-11% 4.4 - 16 M€ 
 
C. Summary 
The data from the empirical studies suggests that the values for alpha could range from 
3-20 M€ per km of track flooded, with a most likely value around 5. The results from 
the engineering estimation yield estimates between 1 and 16, with a most likely value 
between 5 and 12. Considering the manifold uncertainties, we consider this to be 
relatively good agreement given that these estimations were developed using 
independent methods. 
In light of these examinations, we have defined the values of alpha and beta according 
to Table 4.5. It is felt that these represent a reasonable estimate of the uncertainty in the 
potential damage, as the range is supported by two independent lines of evidence. 
Subjectively, it is believed that the use of these values will result in slightly 
conservative (high) estimates of the damage. The data drawn from case studies may be 
subject to selection bias (i.e., episodes resulting in extensive damage tend to result in 
more news coverage than episodes resulting in minimal damage). The analytical 
estimates may be biased by the potentially high as-built costs of the Vienna subway. 
However, this conservatism is not expected to be a major factor and is judged to be well 
within the bounds of the intervals given. Furthermore, sensitivity studies can be 
performed to examine the impact of this possible conservatism.  
 
Table 4.5: Adopted values for alpha and beta for use in Equation 4.4 
Parameter Value from [21] Value in this study 
Damage per length of track flooded (α) 7 U(1,20) 
Damage Multiplier (β) 1* 1-exp(-λQ) 
*Implicit: damages were defined at 63 m³/s. 
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The basic damage equation is therefore largely a function of two stochastic variables, 
alpha and Q. The distribution of alpha, which has a simple distributional form, was the 
subject of Chapter 4. The distribution of Q was based upon the hydraulic simulation 
model, as discussed previously. This is a non standard distribution, thereby suggesting 
the use of numerical techniques. The way in which this equation is implemented 
comprises the subject of the next chapter.  
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5.  Abstraction Methodology and Implementation 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the way in which a model was constructed to 
tie together the analyses described in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 corresponds to the 
"scientific" or "hazard" module discussed in the introduction, and Chapter 4 
corresponds to the "engineering" or loss computation module. As discussed, each of 
those analyses provide a set of distributional inputs. This chapter discusses the final 
step, namely, the integrating module. This corresponds to the "insurance coverage" 
module discussed previously. However, the integrating module need not focus on 
insurance coverage. This approach can also be used to illustrate the effect of different 
mitigation measures on absorbed damages. 
This chapter therefore attempts to fulfill three objectives. The first is to illustrate a 
method for dealing with both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty using a risk curve. The 
second goal is to create appropriate model abstractions. Because the analysis provided 
in Faber and Nachtnebel (2003) and summarized in Chapter 3 was very detailed, there 
was a need to create a "reduced form" of the analyses contained in that report. Running 
the type of physical simulation analyses of the sort carried out in Chapter 3 is 
computationally prohibitive when the simulation must consider hundreds or thousands 
of simulations of different possible values.  In such cases, a reduced form may be 
substituted for the more complex model. The goal of the reduced or abstracted model is 
to capture the salient elements of the more complex results (cf. Morgan and Henrion 
(1990) p. 215). The third and final goal of this chapter is to introduce and define the 
different hypothetical structural and non-structural mitigation measures considered in 
this case study. Two structural measures (detention basins and portable flood barriers) 
were considered in conjunction with three financial measures (reserve funds, borrowing, 
and insurance). The way in which these were abstracted and parameterized will also be 
discussed in this chapter. The basic approach to developing the risk curve was adapted 
from Ermolieva et al (2001) and is as follows: 
1. Identify a planning period of interest (PPI) corresponding the time frame of concern 
of the decision maker. 
2. Assume that a severe storm of an arbitrary magnitude occurs within the PPI and 
compute the a priori likelihood of that storm based upon a known rainfall-probability 
distribution such as a Gumbel distribution. Repeat this process multiple times to 
produce a set of rainfall-probability pairs. In order to increase computational efficiency, 
only sample from events that are likely to cause damage. For example, because damages 
are not expected at storms with recurrence intervals of less than one hundred years, only 
storms with recurrence periods exceeding this value are considered. It should be noted 
that this introduces a conditional probablility; namely, we are sampling from a subset of 
all possible storms and must therefore apply the appropriate probability correction to 
convert the conditional probabilities computed in the model to absolute probabilities. 
3. Transform the rainfall, using an appropriate rainfall-runoff relationship, to discharge 
in the Vienna river. Determine the amount of water entering the subway system as a 
result of this rainfall. This step corresponds to the computation of water levels in a more 
traditional flood risk assessment concerned with damages to structures in a floodplain, 
such as was implemented in Ermolieva et al (2001). The effects of ex-ante structural 
mitigation measures, which influence the level of water entering the system, are 
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considered at this point. One has now transformed the set of rainfall-probability pairs to 
a set of overflowing water-probability pairs.  
4. Determine the direct tangible damages resulting from the overflowing water. One has 
now transformed the set of rainfall-probability pairs to a set of direct damage-
probability pairs. Plot the sets of damage/probability pairs on the risk curve described 
previously. If parameter values were sampled from distributions representing epistemic 
uncertainty in the preceding calculations, a scatterplot will be generated. 
4a. To provide a clear representation of the relationships, produce curves rather than 
scatterplots by taking subsets corresponding to specified probability intervals and 
computing the mean or fractiles of the distributions. This represents a conditional 
probability distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty in damages given that an 
event falling within a specified probability band (e.g., the 100 year flood) occurs. Note 
that this distribution may not be a normal distribution, so use of the standard deviation 
to determine confidence intervals is suspect unless one has verified that the conditional 
distributions are in fact normal distributions. This can be done formally or simply and 
quickly by plotting the conditional frequency histogram and ensuring that the 
distribution is not skewed or overly broad/narrow. The simplest way to generate these is 
simply to compute means or fractiles directly from the sample8. That was the approach 
chosen here. 
5. Estimate the impact of non-structural mitigation measures such as insurance or 
reserve funds on the total pre- and post-disaster costs incurred to manage the flood. This 
is done by estimating to what extent the losses can be compensated from a reserve fund 
or an insurance policy, and if the losses cannot be fully covered, obtain a loan to cover 
the costs. The premia paid before the event are counted as costs, as are the interest 
payments made on any loans taken out after the event. 
These steps are described in more detail below. Details of the algorithms used are given 
in this section. 
5.1  Model Abstraction: Flood Hazard Analysis 
The hazard analysis was developed from the analysis discussed in Chapter 3 and in 
extensive detail in Faber and Nachtnebel (2003). It became clear as a result of 
discussions and review of the analyses that the uncertainty in the rainfall - particularly 
for rare events - was a major driver of the uncertainty in the likelihood catastrophic 
floods. It was therefore desired to evaluate this directly within the model and separate 
problem of system failure into two components:  
1) Determination of the distribution of rainfall and runoff in the river, with the 
attendant uncertainties, and  
2) Determination of the conditional likelihood and magnitude of system failure that 
occurs at different levels of runoff. 
                                                 
8
 The careful reader might note that the way in which the estimator is computed and its potential error 
may also a function of the distribution. We do not deal with this problem in this analysis. 
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The algorithm chosen to do this was introduced previously. A more detailed description 
follows. 
5.1.1  Rainfall Determination 
The first step is to sample from a probability distribution describing the peak six hour 
rainfall. This can be done either by sampling the rainfall and then determining the 
probability of occurrence from the appropriate probability distribution, or by sampling a 
probability and then determining the associated rainfall. For purposes of computational 
efficiency, we selected a procedure that provided increased sampling of low probability 
events. A variant of importance sampling was chosen to provide even coverage of the 
tails of the distribution by sampling over the negative log of the probability from a 
uniform distribution. The rainfall corresponding to the selected probability was then 
determined. Based on the analyses in Chapter 3, the probability of the selected rainfall 
was presumed to follow a Gumbel Type I distribution. The Gumbel Type I distribution 
is defined by the CDF given (Beyer 1968) as 
)))n(exp(exp()n(F β α−−−= ,                                                                           (5.1a) 
The mean and variance of this distribution are given by  
6
5772.0
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                                                                                            (5.1b) 
Given an exceedence probability p, one can also therefore solve for the rainfall to which 
it corresponds. 
))pln(ln(n −β−α=                                                                                          (5.2) 
The resulting set of (n,p) pairs defines the probabilistic rainfall-recurrence relationship. 
The results for the Gumbel distribution with a mean value of 29.44 and a standard 
deviation of 16.75 are illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Rain depth as a function of return period 
 55
 5.1.2  Flow Rate Determination 
The next step is to determine the flow rate of the Vienna River at Km 4 resulting from 
the sampled rainfalls.   This problem was discussed in Chapter 3.  Detention basins are 
installed upstream, and these function by modifying the downstream flow rate. They do 
this by accumulating water while the river is rising, thereby moderating the rise in water 
levels downstream, and then releasing the water levels after the flood peak has passed. 
At some point, however, the basins may become full and lose their ability to store water 
for later discharge. As discussed by Faber and Nachtnebel (2003), modifications are 
being carried out to give operators more control over the filling and emptying of the 
basins.  
Therefore, the downstream discharge is a function of both the peak rainfall and the 
basin state. This was examined by the use of a detailed rainfall-runoff model. Because 
the incorporation of the detailed model is computationally prohibitive, a reduced form 
model is used that determines the discharge at Vienna River Km 4 corresponding to the 
sampled rainfall by the use of the lookup tables given in Chapter 3 and reproduced here.  
These lookup tables simulate the effect of the retention basins in one of four possible 
states: no retention basins, non-upgraded retention basins, upgrades to Auhof-
Mauerbach retention basins only (the assumed current condition), and completed 
upgrades on all retention basins. 
 
Table 5.1: Rainfall-Runoff Relations at Vienna River Km 4 as a function of Basin 
State 
Six Hour Rainfall 
(mm) 
Peak Discharge at Vienna River Km 4 (m³/s) 
 No Basins Non-Upgraded Assumed Current Upgrades 
Complete 
0 0 0 0 0 
28 69 68 66 68 
51 177 175 175 174 
65 247 243 242 243 
84 346 265 320 294 
118 561 518 463 424 
134 668 607 584 567 
160 841 751 737 726 
200 1106 971 971 971 
300 1770 1522 1522 1522 
 
The resulting deterministic discharge exceedence curves are shown in Figure 5.2 based 
upon the rainfall return period plot shown above. 
We note that this approach implies that there is no uncertainty associated with the 
response of the detention basins. The computed uncertainty in the discharge is simply 
the transformation of the uncertainty in the rainfall. A more complete analysis might 
include the effect of the uncertainty in the rainfall-runoff model, developed by running 
the rainfall-runoff model with the rainfall as a constant value and the other parameters 
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allowed to vary stochastically. However, because we believe that the uncertainties in the 
rainfall are likely to dominate the uncertainties introduced by the detention basins, and 
because the model is intended to be an illustrative model, we simply include the 
deterministic lookup tables. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Rainfall-Runoff Relations at Vienna River Km 4 as a function of 
Basin State 
5.1.3  Overflow Determination 
The final step is to determine the amount of water flowing into the subway. Based upon 
examination of the results in Faber 2003 and in Chapter 3, it was hypothesized that the 
flow rate of overflowing water could be could be roughly estimated from the flow rate 
in the main channel. This hypothesis was generated by the observation that the 
likelihood of failure of the system appeared to be correlated with the probability that the 
flow exceeded some critical level. Furthermore, it was assumed that flow in the U4 can 
be represented by the difference between the critical level of flow and the flow in the 
channel.  The observation that the failure probability seemed to track flow exceedence 
probability suggests that the probability of failure increases dramatically once some 
"critical" flow is exceeded. This hypothesis appears valid based upon examination of 
the system and upon inspection of the results in Faber and Nachtnebel (2003). A failure 
that results in the release of water to the U4 occurs when the discharge in the Vienna 
River exceeds some threshold amount resulting either in overtopping of the floodwall or 
collapse of the floodwall due either to foundation scouring or hydrostatic pressure. It is 
clear that an overtopping failure is largely a function of the flow rate in the channel, and 
the uncertainties are largely those associated with the channel geometry, wall height, 
and roughness coefficients. Because this is a channelized river with a well-characterized 
geometry, it is not thought that these contribute substantially to the uncertainty in the 
water flow rate at which overtopping is expected. Similarly, erosive failure and wall 
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collapse is largely a function of the computed shear at the channel bed and the shear 
strength of the invert. There is likely to be more uncertainty in these parameters.  It was 
determined that a failure leading to overflowing of the U4 occurs at a discharge of 
approximately 530 m³/s. Because of the uncertainties in the resistance parameters of the 
floodwall, however, this is not a fixed value but is represented by a probability 
distribution. In this simulation the "critical" discharge is modeled as a normal 
distribution with mean 530 and standard deviation of 10 m³/s. This implies that the 
failure of the basin could occur with a five percent probability at a flow rate of 510 m³/s 
and would be almost certain (95% likely) to occur once flows in the main channel 
exceeded 550 m³/s. 
4VRKCRITICAL4U QQQ −= ;                                                                                (5.3) 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the estimated peak discharge and the flow 
into the subway terrace with a Q_CRIT of 530 m³/s. Also shown is an indication of the 
total volume of water discharged into the terrace. Although the hydrograph was not 
computed, this plot was produced by approximating the peak of the hydrograph as a 
triangle and assuming that the duration of the flooding over the critical discharge is 
proportional to the difference between the peak discharge and the critical discharge. For 
this curve, it was assumed that a peak discharge of 730 m³/s would result in a period of 
three hours above the critical discharge of 530 m³/s.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Estimation of Overflowing Water.  Upper: Approximate peak 
overflow rate. Lower: Approximate total overflowing volume 
It is important to note that this distribution is a rough approximation used to abstract the 
reliability assessment provided by Faber and Nachtnebel (2003). If this analysis were to 
be extended, it would be desirable to conduct a more detailed examination of this 
conditional failure probability distribution. However, for purposes of illustration, we 
will proceed with this rough approximation. Provided that the "critical level of flow" 
hypothesis is valid, the model could be easily updated simply by changing the 
parameters of the distribution for the critical level of flow value. It is believed that the 
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second approximation, that of computing the discharge in the subway as the difference 
between the runoff and the critical level of flow, is a reasonable assumption for flows 
below that necessary for the water level in the terrace to equal that of the main channel. 
At higher flows, this would be an overestimate, as a portion of the flow would be 
carried in the main channel. For collapse failures, this could be a significant 
underestimation. Once the collapse occurred, a significant amount of channel flow 
might be diverted into the subway terrace. However, because of the way in which the 
damage function to the subway is defined, these are not critical. We also note that this 
approach captures the characteristic that the protective system is a hard-fail rather than a 
soft-fail system. In other words, the system of detention basins and masonry floodwalls 
provides a very high level of protection up until a certain river flow rate. However, once 
that system fails, the level of damage can be expected to rise rapidly. This is in contrast 
to a soft fail system such as flood-hardening, which would increase the ability of the 
system to withstand inundation9. 
5.2  Damage Assessment 
As discussed previously, we consider the damage to be a function of the length of track 
that is flooded. Model abstraction is not needed for this portion of the analysis, as the 
damage estimation technique was sufficiently simple that it is not computationally 
expensive, and it was developed with implementation in the catastrophe model in mind. 
Estimation of the physical damage requires two parameters: the length of track that is 
flooded, and the damage per length flooded. 
5.2.1  Length flooded 
It is assumed that the subway consists of two sections. One section is not protected by a 
floodgate and is inundated in every case if there is a flood (although the damages may 
be equal to zero; see below for the definition of the damage multiplier). This section is 
approximately 7.5 km long from the location where the U4 crosses the Vienna river at 
km 10.610 to the portable flood barriers installed at the Große Einwolbung at 
approximately km 3.1. It is conservatively assumed that the inundation can occur at any 
point along the section.  This assumption is conservative as the most likely point for 
flooding to occur is just before the portable flood barrier is installed. A better 
distribution would therefore be positively skewed, making shorter track lengths flooded 
more likely than longer track lengths flooded.  A more detailed model might consider 
the conditional probability of flooding and explicitly model failure probabilities at each 
location, generating a conditional probability distribution of the length flooded. Such an 
analysis was not performed, however, and the length flooded in this section was 
therefore modeled as a uniform random variable U(0,7.5) to determine the length of 
unprotected track flooded. 
                                                 
9
 This is not intended as a critique of the well-designed flood protection system in place. Implementation 
of flood-hardening for the Vienna metro may be overly expensive, infeasible, or even impossible. The 
point is to illustrate the financial characteristics of different mitigation alternatives and their 
combinations. 
10
 The point of a likely first inundation was reported (Neukirchen 1994) to be located at 
Braunscheiggasse at km 8.6. This would yield a distance of 5.5 km for the unprotected reach.  
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The other section is protected by a floodgate. If the floodgate works, none of the section 
is flooded. If the floodgate fails, all of this section is flooded. However, the length of 
track that is protected by the floodgate is not precisely known, as the entire system was 
not modeled. Because of the lack of detailed analyses, this was treated as an epistemic 
uncertainty and was modeled as a random variable with an upper and lower bound. 
Potential upper and lower bounds on the lengths at risk were estimated.  We take, as a 
minimum, that the U4 would be flooded until the outlet into the Donaukanal, for a total 
inundated stretch of 3.1 km. Because water entering the Karlsplatz station could provide 
a point of entry of water into the U1 line, we assume that the U1 would be flooded, at a 
minimum, between Südtirolerplatz and Reumannplatz, for a total distance of 2.9 km. To 
set an upper bound, we presume that the maximum stretch of the U1 that could be 
flooded would be between Reumannplatz and Vorgartenstraße, for a maximum 
inundation potential of 6.5 km for the U1. Water entering either the Wien Mitte station 
via the U4 or the Stephansplatz station via the U1 could result in inundation of the U3. 
We take, at a minimum, flooding of the U3 between Burgasse and Schlachthausgasse 
for a total of 4.4. km flooded. To set an upper bound, we presume that the U3 could be 
inundated as far as Simmering, for a total inundation length of 7.7 km. This results in 
the following upper and lower bounds: 
Protected Stretch (lower bound): 3.1 km U4 + 2.9 km U1 + 4.4 km U3 = 10.4 km 
Protected Stretch (upper bound): 3.1 km U4 + 6.5 km U1 + 7.7 km U3 = 17.3 km 
We therefore model the length flooded as the sum of a U(0,7.5) and a U(10.4,17.3) 
distribution.  
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5.2.2  Damage per Length Flooded 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is assumed that the damage per length flooded (alpha) is 
presumed to be a uniform variable ranging from 1 to 20 M€ per km flooded. As 
previously noted, there was insufficient data to establish an empirically or theoretically 
grounded relationship between overflowing water and damage. However, it was clear 
that at low flows (which we define as 5-10 m³/s) the damage would be slight, but that 
damages would rise quickly as the pumping and drainage capacity of the subway was 
overloaded and would quickly reach the maximum potential damage.  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, an exponential form was chosen for mathematical convenience to represent 
the relationship between overflowing water and percent damage. In order to reflect the 
sharp rise of damages with overflowing water, an exponential function discussed in 
Chapter 4 was chosen. The value of lambda was chosen to give a 50% damage at a flow 
of 20 m³/s.  
35.0
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==λ                                                                                              (5.4) 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the synthetic conditional damage curves and shows how these 
compare to the ranges of damage reported for catastrophic flooding on similar systems. 
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 Figure 5.4: Comparison of the synthetic conditional damage distribution for 
Vienna with case study reports 
For distributional sensitivity analyses, an alternative variant explored was to use normal 
distributions rather than uniform distributions to estimate the damages. In this variant, 
the variable representing the length of the protected areas of track was modeled as a 
normal distribution with mean 13.85 and standard deviation of 3.45. The distribution 
was truncated at zero to ensure that no negative values were obtained. Likewise, the 
damage function was modeled as a normal distribution with mean 10 and standard 
deviation 5, and was again truncated at zero to ensure no negative damages. The results 
are shown in Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.5a: 
 
Figue 5.5b; 
Figure 5.5: Effect of Distributional Forms.  A) Uniform  B) Normal 
 
The loss of revenues associated with foregone fares was also considered.  In order to 
obtain a rough, order of magnitude estimate of this effect, we assume that the service 
interruption is also a function of the length of track flooded. Based upon the experience 
of past inundations, we take this value as five days per km track flooded. In 2001, the 
total subway ridership was approximately 400 million passengers (Wiener Linien, 
2002).  Dividing this number by 365 days per year and assuming that the U4 carries 
approximately 20% of the passenger load, we obtain a daily ridership on the U4 of 
approximately 200,000 rides.  At a ride cost of 2€ per ride, we can derive a total fare 
loss of approximately 2 M€ per km flooded. Because this is only a small part of the 
maximum total potential damage, we presume that this is already subsumed within the 
damage estimates. A more detailed analysis might be able to explore this in more detail 
by examining the effect on revenues of planned outages while tracks are closed for 
normal maintenance. The exercise discussed here was simply a quick examination of 
the potential relative contribution to losses of lost fares and repair costs. 
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5.3  Financial Parameters 
In this section, we will introduce and discuss the implementation of a number of 
different potential financial mitigation measures. Direct damages are the input to the 
financial module. Two ex-ante financing measures, insurance and a reserve fund, are 
considered. One ex-post financing measures, borrowing, is considered. Budgetary 
diversion would be simple to include, but was not implemented in this version of the 
model. The methods for computing financial parameters follows Ermolieva (2001) and 
Mechler and Pflug (2002), and the nomenclature of the model parameters follows 
Mechler and Pflug (2002). We note that inflationary risks are not computed explicitly. 
All amounts are computed in real terms. This introduces a bias. In particular, insurance 
is not adjusted for potential changes in inflation, whereas inflationary risks associated 
with investment assets are included implicitly by the use of a real rather than nominal 
rate of return. If the insurance contract is denominated in a stable currency, such as a 
dollar, euro, or swiss franc, this may not be a major issue. However, if the insurance 
contract is denominated in a potentially unstable currency, and adequate contractual 
safeguards are not maintained, then there could be considerable inflationary risks in the 
value of the insurance contract. 
5.3.1  Determine the timing of the first severe event 
An important parameter in examining the impact of different financial measures such as 
insurance or reserve funds is the arrival time of the first event, as this will determine to 
what extent a reserve fund has accumulated funds or for how long have premia been 
paid. The arrival time of the first occurrence of an event that can occur in any year with 
constant probability p is given by a geometric distribution (Beyer 1968). 
1)p1(p)(f)t(P −τ−=τ=τ=                                                                               (5.5) 
It can be shown, by expanding the terms in a binomial expansion, that this 
approaches a uniform distribution with 
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as pT << 1. The arrival time is therefore modeled as a uniform distribution. 
5.3.2  Insurance 
Insurance can be simulated as either proportional insurance or as excess of loss 
insurance, or both. However, the model is currently limited in that it is currently 
possible to define only one layer. The following parameters are used to characterize 
insurance: • The attachment point, or "deductible", of the insurance. 100% of all losses 
below the attachment point are borne by the policyholder. • The proportion of losses within the insured layer that is borne by the 
policyholder. Setting this value to 1 causes insurance to be inactive (i.e., if the 
policyholder bears 100 percent of the losses, then the insurer pays no claims.  
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The claims are computed as a proportion to the total loss exceeding the attachment 
point. However, in order to define the upper limit of the layer, the claim payments are 
capped by an exit point. • The exit point, or "cap", of the insurance. This is the maximum claim payment 
by the insurer. 
Claims are therefore computed by the following relation: 
Claim=min(Exit Point,(1- Proportion)*max(0, Damage-Attachment Point)); 
The resulting relationship between claim payments, retained losses, and damages is 
illustrated by an example figure showing the effect of an attachment point of 10M€ in 
direct damages, a 20% co-insurance proportion, and an exit point of 100M€ in claims as 
shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Structure of Insurance 
 
There are two possibilities for determining risk premia. One would be to define the 
premiums to be equal to the expected claims. In essence, this assumes that insurance is 
"costless". In reality, the costs of insurance are non-zero, due to the need for 
administrative costs, profits, and risk premia. An assumption of costless insurance may 
be reasonable for a risk-neutral public insurance program that incurs only administrative 
costs. For private insurance, the costs are likely to be higher due to the need for profit 
and the charging of a risk premium. In Mechler and Plug (2002), the functional form of 
the premium loading factor is simply PLF=1+0.03Tr.  We compute premium payments 
in a fashion similar to Mechler and Pflug by charging a risk premium is charged for low 
probability events. However, the functional form identified above raises the questions of 
which return period to use to compute the premium loading factor, namely, the return 
period of the underlying event or the return period of the loss. The use of the return 
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period of the event is equivalent to the highly conservative assumption that variability in 
the insurers losses are dominated by the variability in this particular policy. The return 
period of the insurer's losses is probably the appropriate parameter to use. However, this 
requires data on the full portfolio of the insurer. A well structured insurance portfolio 
would not allow itself to be exposed to such an extent, and the risks of the flood would 
be spread among risks associated with the other policies issued by the insurer. We 
therefore charge the risk premium a constant, user-defined premium loading factor. We 
note that for a company underwriting with signficant catastrophic risks, the integration 
of the different catastrophes into an integrated catastrophe model may be an efficient 
way to determine an appropriate premium loading factor. However, such an analysis 
must be a part of future work.  The expected claim payments are simply the probability 
weighted claim payments.  The use of a risk premium adds the Premium Loading factor, 
such that the annual premia are simply taken to be the expected claims adjusted by the 
PLF. The accumulated insurance reserve is simply the accumulated premiums minus the 
claim payment at the time of the catastrophe. If collected premiums are sufficient to 
cover the claims, the insurance reserve is positive and the premiums have been 
"overpaid". If the collected premiums are insufficient to cover the claims, then the 
insurance reserve is negative and the claims are "underpaid". The losses retained by the 
policyholder are simply the damages minus the claims. 
Retained Loss=max(0,Damages - Claims); 
5.3.3  Reserve Fund 
We presume that the reserve fund is invested in a relatively safe security, such as bonds. 
The reserve fund comprises two components: a one-time initial investment, and a 
constant annual payment. 
Accumulated Funds=Initial Reserve Fund*((1+Yield)τ) 
+AnnualPayment*(((1+Yield τ)-1)/Yield; 
The growth of the reserve fund with a 10M€ initial contribution, a 1M€ annual 
contribution, and a 5% rate of interest is shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7: Accumulation of Reserve Funds 
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 The difference between the contribution and the balance represents the benefit of the 
reserve fund. It can be seen that benefit is quite small for short time horizons (<10 
years, but increases significantly thereafter due to compounding. 
A significant methodological questions is the "cost" of the reserve fund, a question 
related to the "cost" of capital. This is a difficult question, discussed at length in 
Kielholz (2000). Typically, this is evaluated by measuring the opportunity cost of 
investing in a safe investment vs a more profitable but more volatile investment, such as 
equities. The equity premium might therefore be used to determine the "cost" of the 
capital. However, this can be misleading. Equities are typically considered to be more 
volatile, and thus carry a higher downside risk than bonds (whether this is true or not 
when measured in real terms, depending upon the holding period, is not clear). A 
probabilistic assessment might show that there is a significant probability that the equity 
premium is in fact negative, as would be the case if equities under performed bonds (as 
occurred several times over the past century). In this case, there may actually be a 
"negative" cost associated with holding the funds in a reserve fund. Essentially, one 
might inadvertently profit from a forced investment in less volatile investment. One 
need only consider the financial history of the last several years to provide an 
illustration of such a phenomenon. 
Because we have chosen to integrate financial uncertainties with structural 
uncertainties, we have modeled the yield of the reserve fund as a random variable. 
Information on the potential uncertainties of investment yield can be obtained from 
Dimson and co workers (2002), who present data on the performance of bonds and 
equities over a century from many different markets. Because the uncertainties in yields 
are expected to be a function of how long the investments are held, we illustrate the 
concept of equity premium in the figure below showing the real (inflation adjusted) rate 
of returns to bonds and equities in two markets with relatively good records over the 
past century (Switzerland and the US), one developed economy that suffered two period 
of devastating inflation (Germany), as well as the world aggregate values. 
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 Figure 5.8: Real Returns to Equities and Bonds: Average Return as a function of 
Holding Period (adapted from Dimson et al. 2002) 
It is clear that on average, equities outperform bonds. Swiss equities have provided a 
fairly stable 5% real rate of return when held for periods of ten years or more, in 
comparison with typical bond returns of less than 3%. The traditional argument for 
holding a reserve fund in bonds rather than equities is that bonds are less volatile than 
equities and carry less downside risk. In other words, it is expected that money invested 
in bonds is safer and more likely to be available when needed than would the same 
amount invested in bonds. We can explore this hypothesis by examining the volatility 
these same instruments, which we define as the standard deviation of the rates of return. 
The results are shown below. 
 
Figure 5.9: Real Returns to Equities and Bonds: Standard Deviation of Return as 
a function of Holding Period (adapted from Dimson et al. 2002) 
 67
  
The impression that bonds are much safer than equities does not appear to be valid 
when inflation is taken into account by examining the volatility of real rather than 
nominal rates of return. We can see that, in general, bonds are only slightly less volatile 
than equities when inflation is taken into account. This is because the variability in 
inflation becomes a controlling factor when the other uncertainties are made low. We 
note that if countries experiencing significant disruptions (e.g., Germany) are included, 
bonds can even have negative average yields with high volatility. 
We wish to acknowledge that there is much work that has been done in this field, and 
that this is only a very simple approach. However, it does illustrate that the tradeoff 
between yield and volatility in the choice of an investment interest is not simple. In this 
paper, we have taken an approach that emphasizes this point by investing the reserve 
fund in a "conservative" equity, thereby emphasizing that the opportunity costs of a 
fund are sensitively dependent upon the choice of a baseline used for determining the 
value of the foregone alternative. Furthermore, if it is assumed that the performance of a 
reserve fund is not affected by the occurrence of a flood, one may decide that the low 
base probability of a flood offsets the potential for low returns. The value of the 
catastrophe model is precisely is that it allows such tradeoffs to be made explicitly and 
examined. 
We have therefore chosen to have our hypothetical reserve fund invested in a “safe” 
equity.  We take this equity as having a real rate of return characterized by an average 
yield of 5% and a standard deviation given by the regression relation illustrated in 
Figure 5.9, namely, . 7889.0−=τσ
The comparison between the synthetic yields that we have generated and the observed 
performance of Swiss equities is shown below. Both because the uncertainty in yields 
can be quite large for short holding periods (less than 10 years11), we show both linear 
and log scales. 
                                                 
11
 This relation would not be expected to hold true for very short periods, as the range of potential returns 
starting at any given year would be constrained and would not be as dramatic as shown here.  The 
inaccuracy induced by the use of this relationship is substantially mitigated by the low level of 
compounding over shorter periods in relation to longer periods.  However, a more rigorous treatment of 
the uncertainty in yields would be necessars if this study were to be applied to short planning periods. 
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 Figure 5.10a: 
 
Figure 5.10b: 
Figure 5.10: Comparison of Real Returns to Synthetic Equities to Historical Real 
Returns to Swiss Equities (adapted from Dimson et al. 2002) 
 
5.3.4  Borrowing 
We implement post-disaster borrowing with an extremely simple model. The cost of a 
loan is simply the difference between the amount borrowed and the amount repaid, and 
is a standard computation shown below.  We take the period to be a fixed thirty years 
and assume that the average loan interest rate of 4% (real), and allow the interest rate to 
be an uncertain random variable that can range between 2%-6% real at a 2σ confidence 
level. We note that these are unfavorable terms, albeit not unreasonably so. An agent of 
the Austrian government, given the good credit standing and alternate financial 
resources, would probably not be required to pay such rates nor would have to amortize 
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the loan over such a long period. These values are chosen somewhat arbitrarily but are 
intended to emphasize the fact that borrowing is also a mitigation measure with 
substantial costs, and that the decision not to mitigate may be an implicit decision to 
assume a loan at whatever terms may be obtainable if a disaster occurs. 
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6.  Results 
In this chapter, we shall examine the consequences of implementing a number of 
different mitigation measures using the simple integrated model we have constructed. 
These mitigation measures are built up from combinations of the remedial alternatives.  
The goal of this section is to examine the impact of selected decisions regarding 
mitigation of flood risks to the subway. There are, in principle, a number of possible 
alternatives. Two of the structural alternatives that are being implemented, as discussed 
previously, are upgrades to the detention basins and installation of a portable flood 
barrier at the entrances to the underground portions of the U4. 
6.1  Structural Measures 
A no action alternative was considered to establish a base case. The no action 
alternative considers essentially the pre-1990 condition. It was presumed that the 
detention basins are in place, but no measures are taken to allow operability. The 
floodbasins fill and empty passively. The masonry floodwall is also assumed to be in 
place. It is assumed that if damages occur, the losses will be covered by a loan. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the loan is assumed to be a thirty-year loan with a real 
interest rate between 2-6%. It is assumed that unlimited credit is available. Alternative 1 
is the installation of a portable flood barrier at the openings to the covered sections of 
the metro (see figure below). The effect of these flood barriers is to limit inundation of 
downstream reaches. Because these systems can be expected to have a reliability of less 
than 100%, it is assumed that these systems have a failure-on-demand rate of 25%. In 
other words, these systems are assumed to fail only once in every four event requiring 
their installation. Because there is no empirical or theoretical basis for this assumption, 
the effect of the reliability of these flood barriers on the results will be examined. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the installation of these systems costs E100,000 and 
costs E10,000 per year to maintain. This is simply an estimate of the costs associated 
with two person-months of design services and two-person months of construction and 
testing costs, combined with a materials cost of E50,000. Annual operating costs. 
(inspection, testing, and occasional repair) are assumed to be 10% of installation costs. 
These costs can be specified by the user. Alternative 2 comprises upgrading of the 
basins to allow controlled filling and release of floodwaters. The system is discussed in 
more detail in Faber (2003). This system, coupled with a real-time flood forecasting 
system, is currently being installed to increase the level of protection against extremely 
rare floods. The costs for this alternative are based on Neukirchen (1994), who reported 
an estimate of E8 million and operating costs that are expected to be 1% of installation 
costs. To emphasize the fact that this is an illustrative example, we have rounded this 
value up to E10 million. The combined scenario represents the combination of portable 
flood barriers and detention basin upgrades.  The results of these scenarios are shown 
below. 
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 Figure 6.1: Examination of Structural Alternatives 
For the base case no-action alternative, it can be seen that over a fifty year period, there 
is approximately a 3% chance that damages could be incurred.  However, because of the 
uncertainty in the rainfall, the range in annual probabilities in which damages might be 
incurred would range between 0.3% (at a 10% confidence level) and 15% (with a 90% 
confidence level). The expected damage over this period is approximately 5ME.  
Because of loan servicing costs, the expected total costs are higher and amount to 8.6 
ME. However, examination of the curve illustrates the problem of using an expected 
damage in this case. The distribution of damages is not a single mode distribution. 
Instead, it essentially represents a combination of a large (~97%) chance of no damage 
and a small chance of a very large damage. The expected value does not represent a 
central tendency of this distribution. The risk curve illustrates this by demonstrating that 
while the chance of damages above zero is approximately 3% (on average), the chance 
that damages are greater than 100 ME is approximately 1%.     
We once again note that this is not a realistic scenario for the city of Vienna. The 
structural mitigation measures are being installed. More significantly, a variety of other 
measures would likely be available to cover the repair costs. These could include 
diversion and contributions from the city or federal government. If a loan was required, 
it is not expected that the interest rate would be as high as that assumed here 
(particularly if it was covered by a bond issue) or that the term would have to be so 
long. However, these financial parameters may be more reasonable for a city in the 
developing world with fewer financial resources, a poorer credit rating, and no plans for 
structural mitigation measures. It is important to keep in mind that, as discussed in the 
introduction, this is an illustrative study. It is not intended to provide concrete policy 
recommendations for the city of Vienna without considerable improvements in the data 
and extensive consultation with decision makers to develop realistic alternatives. 
Examination of Alternative 1 reveals that, relative to the base case, the floodgate does 
not alter the probability at which damages will start to occur. The probability of damage 
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exceeding zero is about 3%, unchanged from the base case. What does change are the 
damages at lower probabilities. The probability that the damages are limited to less than 
50 ME are lowered to approximately 0.5%, and the chance of damages exceeding 100 
ME are considerably less than 0.1%. The expected damage from this case is 
approximately 2 ME, with expected total costs of 4.1 ME. The plot clearly shows that 
the primary role of the floodgate is to limit rather than prevent damage. Using the 
expanded concept of risk, we can say that the floodgate primarily addresses the 
consequences of an event rather than the probability. If risk is defined simply as system 
failure without distinction between large failure and small failure, the floodgates are 
ineffective. However, it is clear from the plot that the floodgates do have a major impact 
in limiting the damages and may be able to limit damages to an "affordable" level. 
Examination of Alternative 2 shows that, as intended, the upgraded detention basins 
lower the probability at which damages will start to occur. The expected probability of 
damage exceeding 0 drops from 3% to slightly over 1.5%. However, once damage 
occurs, it is catastrophic. This is because a storm large enough to overwhelm the 
detention capacity of the basins would cause major damage to an unprotected subway 
system. Furthermore, construction and operation costs must be added to the catastrophic 
costs to yield the total cost of dealing with flooding. This means that there is a 100% 
chance that total costs exceed 10 ME, and there is a 1% chance that total costs will 
exceed 100 ME. The expected damages are reduced from 5 to 3 ME, but the expected 
total costs increase from 8.6 to 18 ME. The plot clearly shows that the primary role of 
the detention basins is to prevent rather than limit damage. From a risk-analytic 
perspective, we can identify this as a measure that affects primarily the probability of an 
event. If risk is defined simply as avoiding adverse consequences at all costs, this 
alternative would not be considered acceptable. However, it is clear from the graph that 
the basins do have a significant effect on the likelihood of incurring damages. If a 
decision-maker is unconcerned with potential damages below a certain level of 
likelihood, this type of alternative may be appropriate. 
Finally, the combined alternative captures some of the desirable elements of the single 
approach, albeit at the cost of including some of the drawbacks as well. Damages are 
limited by the floodgate and their likelihood is reduced by the detention basins. In 
addition, the uncertainty surrounding the losses is decreased. The expected damages are 
reduced to 1.2 ME, with a very low probability that the damages will exceed 100 ME. 
The expected total costs are approximately 16 ME 
6.2  Financial Measures 
The first financial measure to be considered is insurance.  The structure of a potential 
insurance policy was discussed in a previous chapter. We set up a hypothetical 
insurance policy here. The insurance policy variables are all decision variables, so there 
is no basis for selecting any particular set of combinations without knowing the 
decision-makers preference. In this case, we choose to have a €10 million deductible, a 
10% coinsurance rate, a €500 million claims cap, and a premium loading factor of 100% 
(meaning that premiums are collected which are expected to be double the expected 
value of the claims, reflecting the risks borne by the insurer in offering a policy against 
such a catastrophic event).  For purposes of comparison, a 1000% premium loading 
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factor is also shown (reflecting a premium set to be equal to ten times the expected 
claims payment, illustrative of a highly risk-averse or poorly diversified insurer).  
The second financial mechanism is that of a reserve fund. The structure is discussed 
previously. Again, many of the policy variables are decision variables, so there is no 
basis for selecting any particular set of combinations without knowing the decision-
makers preference. In this case, we have chosen a set of variables to mimic the costs of 
the more expensive structural measure by assuming a one time investment of €10 
million and an annual contribution of E0.1 million. We presume that these funds are 
invested in a "safe" equity, which we benchmark as similar to the performance of Swiss 
equities. We note that the investment of the reserve fund in equities rather than bonds 
technically eliminates the cost of this option. The real costs would be the costs 
associated with lack of liquidity, which are beyond the scope of this analysis. The 
combined financial alternative represents a strategy mixing an insurance policy with a 
10 M€ deductible, a 500 M€ cap, and a 20% coinsurance rate with a reserve fund 
comprising a one-time initial contribution of 1 million and an annual contribution of 
€10,000. The computed annual premiums are similar to those of the pure case at 
€150,000 (slightly lower due to the higher coinsurance rate), and the expected total 
costs are -2 ME, representing the possibility that a profit is expected on the basis of no 
flood occurring and the profit being taken from the interest accumulated over fifty years 
on the reserve fund.  
The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 6.2. In the insurance only scenario, 
the expected damage is unchanged (as expected) from the base case, and premiums of 
170K per year are computed using this premium loading factor. The expected total 
costs, including premium payment up until the time of the catastrophe, are 8 ME. With 
the higher (and probably more likely) premium loading factor of 1000%, the premiums 
are close to a million euro per year and the expected total costs are therefore quite high, 
at 34 ME.  However, it can be seen that insurance has an effect remarkably similar 
(from a purely financial perspective) to that of the floodgate. Upon reflection, the reason 
for this is clear. Insurance is intended to limit rather than prevent losses.  It can do this 
quite effectively. Examination of the uncertainty bands also shows the role of insurance 
as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism. In comparison with the floodgate, the insurance 
policy reduces the uncertainty quite effectively (by passing it on to the insurer in the 
form of a contract). However, this case also illustrates the drawback to insurance, which 
is that it can be an expensive option if the event doesn't happen, and the costs are 
sensitively dependent upon the premium loading factor. Another significant factor, that 
is not illustrated by this plot, is the risk that the insurer may withdraw coverage. If a 
structural measure is put in place, the decision maker retains more control over the 
mitigation option. If an insurer withdraws coverage or goes bankrupt, then the policy 
holder is placed back in the position from which they started with no benefit from the 
policy and no future protection.  
 74
  
Figure 6.2: Financial Measures 
The reserve fund reveals a somewhat startling feature in comparison to the other 
alternatives. It is clear that it does nothing to reduce damages (in common with all 
financial measures). What it does do is shift the loss curve to the extent that damages 
can be compensated from accumulated funds. The fund also mitigates the effect of loan 
costs to the extent that funds taken from the reserve fund do not accrue interest 
penalties. This lowers the probability of costs exceeding zero to something slightly 
greater than 1.5%. However, costs can still be quite high, with a 0.8% likelihood of 
costs exceeding 100 ME. On the other hand, there is a major chance that the flood will 
not happen and that the interest on the reserve fund can eventually be either taken as a 
profit or invested in other loss-reduction mechanisms. For this case study, this effect is 
dominant because there is a significant chance of no disaster occurring at all over the 
time period of interest. In this case, the interest earned on the invested funds represents 
a profit. This illustrates the importance of the concept of risk as including potentially 
positive outcomes as well as negative outcomes. Even if an event occurs, the 
accumulated funds may be able to cover the costs if the event is not exceptionally 
severe. It can be seen that the probability of uncovered losses exceeding zero also drop, 
because there is a significant probability that the accumulated funds will be adequate to 
cover the losses. A somewhat hidden, but significant feature is that the loss-reduction 
properties of a reserve fund are amplified by the avoidance of high interest costs. By 
lowering the principal outstanding on a potential loan, the reserve fund is able to avert 
loan costs. However, the catastrophic loss-limiting functions of this mechanism are very 
limited. For an organization facing potentially ruinous losses, the reserve fund does not 
eliminate their exposure in the way that an insurance policy might. Another significant 
contrast with insurance is that a reserve fund not only does not reduce uncertainties, it 
can even increase them (albeit often in a positive direction). Finally, a drawback that is 
not illustrated by this plot is the time dependency of the protection offered, and the 
political risk that the fund will be diverted to other uses rather than being allowed to 
accrue interest. Because a long time period of interest was chosen, there is a significant 
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chance of accruing large balances in the reserve fund. If a short time period was chosen 
(say 10 years), the results might look quite different.   
A clear feature of the combined financial alternative is that it combines the low 
uncertainty of the insurance policy with the profit-generating possibilities of the reserve 
fund, a point illustrated by the graph. The benefit of a highly loaded insurance policy, 
on the other hand, would not be so high, although the reserve fund might be designed to 
offset some of the losses associated with premium payments. Of course, this combined 
alternative is subject to the same non-quantified risks discussed for the single solutions. 
An attractive element of this combination, however, is the possibility of an immediate 
risk reduction by the purchase of an insurance policy that takes effect upon purchase. 
The accumulated funds in the reserve fund can help to offset the risk that the insurer 
will choose to withdraw coverage at some point in the future, as sufficient funds may 
have accumulated by that point to cover any possible catastrophe.  
6.3  Mixed Measures 
A final set of three scenarios combined structural measures with both financial measures 
singly and in full combination. This comprised a scenario combining structural 
measures with insurance, and a scenario combining structural measures and both 
financial measures.  For this alternative, we combine the structural measures with an 
insurance policy as defined above, with a 100% premium loading factor.  
For the scenario of structural+insurance, the computed premia are only 30K (provided, 
of course, that an insurer would be willing to offer insurance at that rate).  The 
installation of the floodgate and the upgrading of the detention basins has lowered the 
expected claims, allowing lowered insurance premiums.  Expected damages are 1.1 M€ 
per year, with expected total costs of 16 M€.  An important aspect of this alternative 
over the purely structural combined alternative is that the uncertainty has been 
significantly reduced. Expected total costs are similar, possibly reflecting the savings in 
loan servicing costs of exceptionally large loans offsetting the cost of insurance. The 
real interest lies in the fully combined scenario.  The expected damages are now 1.1 M€, 
leading to annual premia of 30K€. The expected total costs are 3.5 M€, down from 
approximately 8.6 M€ in the base case.  Potential total costs are limited to well under 50  
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 Figure 6.3a: 
 
 
Figure 6.3b: 
Figure 6.3: Mixed Scenarios 
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 M€, and even considering uncertainty, are not expected to rise above 100 M€ regardless 
of the size of the flood. We can see that this approach blends all of the approaches to 
yield a solution in which the advantages of each solution offset many of the 
disadvantages of the single solutions. The inclusion of insurance offsets the 
uncertainties associated the other options. The inclusion of a modest reserve fund helps 
to avoid the potential for lost funds associated with construction of a structural measure 
that may never be called upon to function. The detention basin upgrades and installation 
of the flood barrier reduce expected claims to the point that insurance premia are 
modest. Inclusion of a sensitivity analysis shows that even if the premium loading factor 
is increased to 1000% (premiums = 10x expected claims), the premia are still only 160 
KE and the total costs are approximately the same as the no action alternative, with the 
potential losses still drastically reduced. 
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7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
Our primary conclusion is that the implementation of a concept of risk that integrates 
the different technical perspectives on risk into a unified framework is feasible and 
yields valuable insights into the nature of the protection provided by different mitigation 
alternatives.  This implementation of an integrated concept of risk is achieved by 
identifying a clear assessment variable (total ex-ante and ex-post costs of mitigating 
flood damage) and expressing the probability distribution of this variable under 
different mitigation scenarios using a stochastic complementary cumulative distribution 
function, or "risk curve".  This approach provides considerable additional relevant 
information to a decision maker.  It also allows structuring of the problem in such a way 
as to provide a clearer indication of the advantages and disadvantages of different 
mitigation options.  This has been demonstrated by examining a current problem faced 
by decision makers and using, to the maximum extent possible, accurate and relevant 
data.  We further note that the results highlight the fact that the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular proposed mitigation option are complex and cannot always 
be reduced to a single-valued metric such as expected benefit or system reliability, as is 
typical of an actuarial approach and a probabilistic approach, respectively.  However, 
technical approaches need not rely on a single valued metric.  The portrayal of losses in 
terms of a stochastic risk curve, rather than in terms of a single-valued metric, provides 
considerable additional information without an undue level of complexity.  For 
disciplines focused on the concept of risk as primarily probability (e.g., probability of 
suffering a financing gap or the probability of system failure), we note that 
consequences matter. A failure that results in only minor damages or a financial option 
that results in only a minor financing gap is significantly different than one which 
results in catastrophic damages or an uncloseable financing gap, even if that failure or 
the gap is slightly more likely. The use of a risk curve can distinguish these and allow 
informed decisions.  For analysts whose studies typically focus on expected values that 
combine probability and consequence into a single metric, we note that some options 
appear to be oriented towards the reduction of epistemic uncertainty. For example, a 
decision maker that is highly averse to uncertainty may consider insurance as a viable 
option, given that the fundamental nature of insurance is to transform an uncertain large 
loss into a certain smaller loss. As in any decision problem, the decision maker must be 
aware of their goals and constraints and not allow the analytical tools of the component 
disciplines to define the problem for them. 
A second finding of the study is that although structural (loss-preventing) and financial 
(loss-spreading) mitigation measures may have significantly different characteristics, 
they may still be examined in a consistent way if an appropriate measure of risk can be 
identified.  This is closely connected with the use of a broader conception of risk that 
identifies the strengths and weaknesses of different mitigation measures. Understanding 
the comparative strengths and weaknesses of different instruments can assist in the 
design of a system in which the advantages of some measures are used to offset the 
disadvantages of other measures, thereby reducing and controlling the risks. For 
example, the explicit treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty allowed a 
clarification of the different characteristics of reserve funds vs insurance.  In this case, 
the reserve fund served to reduce (or even offset) the cost of ex-post borrowing, 
although it provided essentially no protection against very large events and did not 
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reduce the uncertainty in the loss curve.  The effect of the reserve fund was to shift the 
risk curve in a beneficial direction at all probability levels.  On the other hand, insurance 
provided protection against the relatively larger and less likely losses and reduced the 
uncertainty associated with the large events.  The effect of the floodgate was similar to 
that of insurance in that losses from very rare events were reduced; however, insurance 
was clearly more effective at reducing the uncertainty of large losses, at the expense of 
increasing costs.  Both of these were quite different from the type of protection provided 
by the detention basins, which served to reduce the probability of losses but was subject 
to considerably uncertainty about the losses when the capacity of the basins could be 
overwhelmed by beyond design-basis storms.  The synergistic effects of combined 
measures were apparent, in that the use of structural measures assisted in mitigating the 
major drawback of insurance (the high cost) by reducing expected losses while the 
insurance policy managed the residual uncertainty associated with the structural 
measures.  Also, the effect of a reserve fund was enhanced when combined with loss 
reduction techniques that extended the potential for accumulating adequate reserve 
funds.  In this case, we were able to demonstrate that using plausible values and realistic 
options drawn from a real flood risk management problem, considerable reduction in 
the total cost of mitigating flood damage may be achieved by combining structural 
measures with financial measures. 
Several methodological issues arose during the course of the study. One is that 
integrating inputs from several disciplines into a single analysis, not surprisingly, can be 
challenging in practice.  Even in the course of an integrated study, the proper way to 
link the output of the hydraulic model to the damage model was not clear. Although a 
solution was found at the end, the study may have looked quite different if the approach 
eventually adopted had been used at the outset12.  This is due in large part to the 
different approaches in conceptualizing the risk analysis problem in the contributing 
disciplines.  It is incumbent on the analysts in such studies to understand the 
assumptions, limitations, and data requirements of the interfacing disciplines 
sufficiently that they may communicate effectively.  However, this suggests that 
integration is not simply a process of completing the component analyses and then 
combining them at the end.   Considerable communication is required throughout the 
process to ensure that the necessary learning processes occur.  Academic studies can 
help in this regard by providing templates and examples of how such integration might 
occur. Another issue that arose late in the study is that there are challenges to 
quantifying the "cost" of a reserve fund in a probabilistic way. The concept of 
opportunity cost, which is a traditional approach in cost-benefit analyses, is a simple 
concept in deterministic terms but is considerably more complex to implement in 
probabilistic terms, when the a “cost” can be negative.  Finally, we note that we have 
approached the treatment of epistemic uncertainty in financial parameters from a very 
empirical, atheoretical, engineering-oriented perspective, as the background of the 
primary authors is largely an engineering background.  Our approach to uncertainty was 
                                                 
12
 It should be noted that this is one of the benefits of performing such a study in an academic rather than 
a consulting framework. Consulting studies typically do not have the luxury of implementing major 
model revisions during the course of the analysis.  The consulting team must start with a clear analytical 
approach before data is collected and simulations performed, or else the study wil quickly run over budget 
and over schedule. At worst, the consulting study may be delayed to the point that it cannot be used for a 
decision that must be made quickly. 
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quite consistent with what Renn has observed as the dominant technical paradigm of 
using "relative frequencies (observed or modeled) as a means to specify probabilities".   
Considerable improvements may be obtained by treating financial uncertainties using 
tools that are more widely accepted within the financial community.   
There were significant limitations in this study which suggest areas where considerable 
improvement could be made in the approach presented herein.  Although there are 
certainly many areas for improvement, it is the authors' opinion that the two major 
technical limitations of this study include the lack of specific accounting for the time 
preference of losses (i.e., no discounting) and the lack of a more thorough investigation 
of the “cost” of a reserve fund.  An appropriate method of discounting for this problem 
was not identified.  It was felt that the standard engineering cost-estimation approach of 
geometric discounting was inappropriate13, due to the relatively long time horizons 
used.  Use of even a moderate discount rate would tend to obscure the impact of large 
events occurring more than a few decades in the future.  However, it is precisely these 
rare, costly, and infrequent events with which we are concerned.  The decision not to 
discount was an explicit decision on the part of the lead author of this report.  A major 
improvement of this study would be an examination of alternate methods for 
discounting future losses from catastrophic events.  Also, as previously discussed, a full 
examination of the "cost" of a reserve fund in the context of a study that includes 
epistemic uncertainty was not carried out.  The difficulties in applying the concept of 
opportunity cost for valuing the cost of a reserve fund were not fully appreciated at the 
outset and did not become apparent until the study was nearing completion.  We also 
note that we have made no attempt at optimization in this analysis, largely because 
optimization requires a clear statement of the goals to be achieved and the constraints 
that are faced. Rather than hypothesize about what these might be, we consider that such 
parameters are best developed in consultation with the decision makers.  
We may return at this point to Renn's discussion of the limitations of technical risk 
analyses.  He identifies four major criticisms of the technical perspectives on risk: 
"First, what people perceive as an undesirable effect depends on their values and 
preferences.  Second, the interactions between human activities and consequences are 
more complex and unique than the average probabilities used in technical risk analyses 
are able to capture.  Third, the institutional structure of managing and controlling risks 
is prone to organizational failures and deficits which may increase the actual 
risk*Fourth, the numerical combination of magnitude and probabilities assumes equal 
weight for both components".  On the other hand, he asserts that the "the narrowness of 
this approach contains both its weakness and its strength. The exclusion of social 
context and meaning from technical risk analysis provides an abstraction that enhances 
the intersubjective validity of the results but at the prices of neglecting the social 
processing of risk."   
                                                 
13
 On the other hand, it was realized that if the losses are associated with replacement of items with a 
value that depreciates due to wear and obsolence, and would be replaced or renewed on a regular basis 
with or without a flood, then high discount rates may be quite appropriate.  In this case, the effect of a 
flood would be more related to the issue of cash flow and an alternate metric (such as maximum annual 
cost rather than total cost incurred) might be more appropriate.  This highlights the need to fully 
understand the objectives and goals of the decision maker before conducting an applied analysis. 
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We believe that these criticisms are well taken, but that it is also useful to distinguish 
between fundamental weaknesses and applied weakness.  Several of the criticisms of 
technical risk analyses do not appear to be fundamental to quantitative simulation 
modeling.  In particular, this study has addressed the fourth weakness and demonstrated 
that this is a problem more in the application than in the fundamental approach of 
technical analyses.  The use of single valued metrics that numerically combine 
probability and consequences are not necessary to the conduct of a technical risk 
analysis.  On the other hand, we do recognize that the use of single-valued metrics is 
extremely common in practice.  Overcoming this applied weakness will not be a trivial 
task.  Several of the other criticisms - namely, that different individuals may value 
negative outcomes differently and that and that the institutional measures are subject to 
organizational failures - can also be partially addressed by improvements in the 
application of simulation techniques by developing models capable of quantifying the 
outcomes of concern to different stakeholders and by including terms for human or 
organizational failure.  However, because quantification is a fundamental aspect of 
simulation modeling, these concerns can probably not be completely addressed within a 
technical framework.  In some cases, the nature of the problem may be such that 
quantitative analysis is simply not the best tool for managing risk. 
However, at least to the extent to which the concerns of different stakeholders can be 
quantified, the virtue of exercises such as these is that they allow the impact of different 
potential goals and constraints to be examined systematically. The value of such 
flexibility may become particularly apparent in situations where multiple stakeholders, 
with different objectives and constraints, must negotiate to determine a jointly 
acceptable solution. This advantage is hinted at by Walker (1997) and it is precisely this 
aspect of catastrophe modeling that is being explored within the Tisza River study by 
Ekenberg et al. (2003) and Brouwers (2003).  Approaches to scenario construction, and 
goal/constraint identification within a negotiated environment are being pursued within 
the Risk, Modeling, and Society Project.  Furthermore, the optimization techniques 
being explored by Ermoliev et al. (2000) and Ermolieva et al. (2001) may allow the use 
of integrated models in a close to realtime environment during meetings and 
negotiations.  Evaluation of the characteristics of alternative financial instruments are 
being pursued by Mechler and Pflug  (2002). It is hoped that this study can contribute to 
the goals of the project by demonstrating an integrative framework that includes 
multiple forms of uncertainty, clarifies the characteristics of different mitigation 
alternatives, and deals with both structural and financial mitigation options on a 
consistent basis.  It remains to future work to weave together the disparate strands of 
full treatment of uncertainty, integration of spatially explicit structural and non-
structural mitigation options, fast optimization, and stakeholder negotiation to achieve 
the integrative possibilities that are now only potential in this type of analysis. 
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